



Security Council

Distr.: General
30 January 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 24 January 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 22 January 2012, addressed to me from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, His Excellency Nabil al-Arabi, and the Prime Minister of Qatar, His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani, regarding the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN Ki-moon**

Annex

League of Arab States

The Secretary-General

22 January 2012

Sir,

In the context of the League of Arab States' response to the Syrian crisis, the Council held an extraordinary session on 22 January 2012 at the headquarters of the General Secretariat in Cairo. The Council heard the technical field report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria concerning the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012. The report set out the findings of the observers, who had been deployed to 20 locations across Syria.

At that meeting, the Arab Ministers for Foreign Affairs discussed the evolving situation in Syria in the light of the report. After examining the latest political and security developments in Syria, they adopted a resolution stating, inter alia, that the Observer Mission would be extended and that coordination should take place with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to support the Mission. The resolution requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to brief the United Nations Security Council in support of the Arab plan of action, in accordance with the resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States.

We therefore transmit herewith the text of the resolution adopted at that session, the report prepared by the Head of the Observer Mission, General Mustafa Al-Dabi, and the report of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States concerning the mandate of the Mission, which was also presented to the Arab Ministers for Foreign Affairs. We should be grateful if you would examine them and take the necessary action to determine a time when the Security Council could meet at the ministerial level with the Chair of the Committee and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. You may also wish to take the necessary action in order to circulate the annexes to this letter to the Member States of the United Nations.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) Nabil **al-Arabi**
Secretary-General

(Signed) Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr **Al-Thani**
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar
Chair of the current session of the League of Arab States
at the ministerial level

Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Enclosure 1

Monitoring of developments in the situation in Syria

Elements of the Arab plan to resolve the Syrian crisis

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the ministerial level at its resumed extraordinary session of 22 January 2012 in Cairo,

Having considered the report submitted by the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria concerning the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred on the Mission by the protocol concluded between the Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States in Cairo on 19 December 2011,

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States concerning the political and technical context of the mandate and new developments in Syria since the League of Arab States began its response to the crisis,

Reaffirming the following statements and resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level: statement 148 issued at an extraordinary session on 27 August 2011; statement 152 issued at the 136th ordinary session on 13 September 2011; resolution 7435 adopted at an extraordinary session on 16 October 2011; resolutions 7436 and 7437 adopted at a resumed extraordinary session on 2 November 2011; resolution 7438 adopted at a resumed extraordinary session on 12 November 2011; resolutions 7439 and 7440 adopted at a resumed extraordinary session in Rabat on 16 November 2011; resolution 7441 concerning developments in the situation in Syria, adopted at a resumed extraordinary session on 24 November 2011; resolution 1900 adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level at an extraordinary session on 26 November 2011; statement 161 issued at an extraordinary session on 20 December 2011; resolution 7442 concerning monitoring of developments in the situation in Syria, adopted at a resumed extraordinary session on 27 November 2011; the statements issued in Doha on 3 and 17 December 2011; and the statement issued in Cairo on 8 January 2012,

Supporting efforts to end the Syrian crisis without foreign intervention, preventing a descent into civil war and preserving the unity and territorial sovereignty of Syria,

Having examined the report of the Head of the Observer Mission to Syria and developments in the situation in Syria,

Welcoming the commendable efforts of the Head and members of the Observer Mission, who have fulfilled their functions courageously under difficult and highly dangerous circumstances,

Recognizing the partial progress made by the Syrian Government in implementing some of its commitments, but considering such progress insufficient,

1. *Affirms* that in order to protect Syrian civilians, all violence and killing from all quarters must cease;
2. *Stresses* that the Syrian Government must

Free the detainees, withdraw all armed presence from cities and residential areas, and grant access to the relevant League agencies and Arab and international media, in order to ensure a free transition throughout Syria and allow examination of the facts and monitoring of events as they unfold;

Recall the Syrian Army and any armed forces of whatever formation to their barracks or original locations;

Facilitate the work of the Observer Mission, allowing it to import any equipment, in particular communications devices;

3. *Decides* to continue supporting and increasing the numbers of the Observer Mission; to provide them with the necessary technical, financial and administrative support; and to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in support of the Mission;

4. *Calls on* the Syrian Government and all strands of the Syrian opposition to enter into genuine political dialogue under the auspices of the League of Arab States within two weeks of this resolution with a view to implementing the following initiative:

(a) A government of national unity should be formed within two months of the dialogue, with the participation of the current Government and opposition under an agreed leader. Its task should be to implement the provisions of the Arab plan of action and prepare for free, multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections, in accordance with a law specifying the procedure and under Arab and international supervision;

(b) The President of the Republic should grant his Vice-President full powers for complete cooperation with the government of national unity in order to enable it to fulfil its functions in the transitional phase;

(c) Once formed, the government of national unity should declare that its aim is to establish a democratic and multi-party system in which all citizens are equal irrespective of their affiliation or sectarian or religious identity, and in which power changes hands peacefully;

(d) The government of national unity should restore security and stability to the country, and reorganize the police service in order to preserve and strengthen public order by performing security functions of a civilian nature, the Arab States undertaking to fund such efforts in coordination with the League of Arab States;

(e) An independent commission should be established with the task of investigating the violations to which citizens have been subjected and establishing the facts in order to ensure justice for the victims;

(f) Within three months of its formation, the government of national unity should hold free and fair elections with Arab and international monitoring to establish a constituent assembly, which should prepare a new draft national constitution for approval by popular referendum and an electoral law based on that draft constitution;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to appoint a special envoy to monitor the political process;

6. *Calls on* the international community to support the government of national unity in order to enable it to fulfil its functions.

7. *Requests* the Chair of the Committee and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to brief the United Nations Security Council in support of this plan, in accordance with the resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States.

Resolution 7444, adopted at a resumed extraordinary session on 22 January 2012.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria expresses its reservation with regard to paragraph 7 of the resolution.

Enclosure 2

Increased funding for activities in implementation of the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the ministerial level at its resumed extraordinary session of 22 January 2012 in Cairo,

Having considered the report submitted by the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria concerning the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred on the Mission by the protocol concluded between the Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States in Cairo on 19 December 2011,

Recalling resolution 7437 concerning the funding of activities in implementation of the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis, adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at a resumed extraordinary session on 2 November 2012;

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States concerning the political and technical context of the mandate and new developments in Syria since the League of Arab States began its response to the crisis,

Having examined the report of the Head of the Observer Mission to Syria and developments in the situation in Syria, and *affirming* that it is important for the Mission to continue to fulfilling its mandate and receiving the necessary technical and financial support,

Pursuant to the recommendation formulated by the Arab Ministerial Committee on the situation in Syria at its meeting of 8 January 2012,

Decides to increase the amount allocated to funding for activities in implementation of the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis from 1 million United States dollars to 5 million United States dollars, subject to further increase in accordance with the conditions and requirements of the work of the Observer Mission.

Resolution 7445, adopted at a resumed extraordinary session on 22 January 2012.

Enclosure 3

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League of Arab States - General Secretariat**Division for the Council of the League****Department of Council Affairs****Meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level at a resumed extraordinary session in Cairo on 22 January 2012****Report of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States concerning the mandate of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria**

I wish to thank and commend General Muhammad Mustafa Al-Dabi and all of the members of the Observer Mission for their efforts and sacrifices in fulfilling their difficult task, which we hope will achieve its objective of achieving progress towards the Arab solution to the Syrian crisis.

The findings of the field report show that while progress has been made, the Syrian Government has yet to pledge immediate and full implementation of its commitments under the Arab plan of action and the protocol of the Legal Centre regarding the mandate of the Observer Mission, which was concluded between the Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States.

I should also like to stress several important points regarding the political and technical context of the Mission's mandate — the difficult circumstances of which present formidable and complex challenges — and developments that have unfolded in Syria since the League of Arab States began to address the crisis. My purpose is to situate the report in its proper political context.

First and foremost, as regards the nature of the Mission:

As you will be aware, the Mission is unprecedented in the history of the political and field action of the League of Arab States, and perhaps also at the international level, in view of the particularities of the Syrian crisis and the international community's response.

This is the first time that a team of civilian observers has been sent to a State experiencing an escalation in civilian protests calling for change and the fall of the regime with the mandate of verifying the Government's implementation of its commitment to end the killings and violence, remove armed presence from cities and residential areas and free detainees. It comes at a time when the Syrian Government retains control of the country.

The Syrian Government is responsible for the safety and security of observers and for escorting their movements and communications on the ground. Paragraph 57 of the report states that the Government side has adopted a

deliberate strategy of seeking to prevent the Mission from accessing the heartlands and keeping it busy with issues that are the concern of the Government side". The Mission was aware of this strategy and resisted such methods, acting in such a manner as to fulfil its mandate as required. It overcame numerous obstacles to its work.

A further complication in the nature of the mandate is that owing to the turn of events, certain streets and residential areas are now outside the control of the Syrian Government. They are controlled by elements loyal to the opposition, including armed irregulars.

The realities on the ground also show that the Syrian security services have continued to treat the situation first and foremost as a security crisis. This explains why the Syrian Government has yet to fully and immediately implement its commitments under the protocol and the Arab plan of action.

Those realities added significant burdens to the work of the observers in the field. In particular, the humanitarian dimensions cannot be ignored. The mandate of the Mission is no longer confined to verifying that the Syrian Government implements its commitments. Instead, it has expanded to include field and humanitarian issues involving the protection of civilians and the recording of witness accounts regarding the situation of human rights in Syria. The observers were encouraged to take on those tasks because the residents of conflict areas, as well as opposition members, called for their protection, presence and assistance in order to confront daily challenges. The presence of observers helped to reassure opposition members. As a result, the numbers of peaceful demonstrators increased in the most recent phase in areas where the observers were present.

The stalemate faced by the Arab solution, the mandate of the Mission and the international community requires the Council of the League of Arab States to reflect on recent developments in the Syrian crisis and on the Arab and international approach. The Mission cannot continue indefinitely or in the absence of a genuine political process.

A decision to extend the mandate must therefore be accompanied by a review of its nature and tasks, not to mention the equipment and staff numbers at its disposal. A decision to extend the mandate without an agreement on a concomitant political process to address the crisis would impact the credibility of the Arab mobilization and the efforts of the observers.

I should now like to make a number of comments regarding the time frame and purpose of the report of the Head of Mission which is before you.

I. The report covers the limited and brief time frame of 29 December 2011 to 18 January 2012, and does not address the previous nine months of the Syrian crisis. The Mission has not been able to go into detail regarding the events and violations that took place during that time, which is outside its remit. This fact must be firmly borne in mind when evaluating the work of the observers. The Mission monitored events in the relatively short period of its presence, as opposed to the crisis as a whole, which began on 15 March 2011.

II. The task of the Mission as stated in the protocol is to verify the Syrian Government's implementation of its commitments under the protocol and Arab plan of action, namely:

1. The cessation of all violence from whatever quarter in order to protect Syrian civilians.
2. The release of those detained as a result of the current events.
3. The removal of all armed presence from cities and residential areas.
4. The granting of access to the relevant League agencies and Arab and international media, allowing them to move freely throughout Syria, examine the facts and monitor events as they unfold.

Those commitments are clear, and the Syrian Government is required to implement them fully and immediately. As the report shows, Syria has yet to fully and immediately implement its commitments since the entry into force of the protocol.

III. It is, however, also clear from the report that during the time of the Observer Mission's work, there was some improvement in the implementation of the commitments made by the Syrian Government. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government has yet to pledge that it will fully and immediately implement those commitments.

IV. Perhaps the most worrying fact mentioned in the report is the excessive use of force by the Syrian security services. Since March 2011, such violence has sparked a reaction from protesters, the opposition and the so-called Free Syrian Army, creating a risk of civil war. Paragraphs 71 and 74 of the report refer to the state of severe tension, injustice and repression to which Syrian citizens are subjected. The opposition has taken to bearing arms as a result of the excessive force deployed by Government forces in response to protests, in addition to the repression, imprisonment, torture and human rights violations perpetrated by the security services.

V. A number of detainees have indeed been released. However, the total number of detainees, and the number of those who remain behind bars, are not precisely known. That situation requires further follow-up on the part of the Mission.

VI. There remain numerous obstacles to media access, even though the presence of Arab and foreign media has been comparatively greater in the most recent phase.

VII. Although the presence of the Mission has not induced the Syrian Government to fully and immediately implement its commitments, it has nevertheless had some positive effects, including the following:

The Syrian people has been given greater freedom to express its position. In many towns, numbers of protesters increased after the observers' arrival.

Numerous individuals have found a means to express their experience and positions through the witness accounts which they provided directly to many members of the Mission.

The Mission was able to monitor and record substantial information regarding the situation of human rights in Syria.

The Mission was able to obtain lists of detainees and missing persons through extensive contact with the people in direct meetings and on the websites created by the League of Arab States for that purpose. The Mission is working to secure their release and to establish the fate of the missing.

In view of the foregoing, I should like to propose the following recommendations:

(a) The mandate of the Observer Mission should be extended, political and media support should be provided, its numbers should be increased, and its technical and other needs should be met, all within the framework of the decisions adopted by the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria on 18 January 2012.

(b) The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States should be requested to contact the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to secure the mobilization of the necessary Arab support.

(c) The Secretary-General should be requested to contact the concerned international and regional parties, including the members of the Security Council, in order to ensure international consensus and support for Arab mobilization and the swift establishment of mechanisms that would develop a political solution to the Syrian crisis, a solution that includes all relevant parties in Syria.

Enclosure 4

League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

"We offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to carry it, and were afraid of it, and man carried it. Surely he is sinful, very foolish" [Qur'an 33: 72]

I. Legal bases

1. By resolution 7436 of 2 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted the Arab plan of action annexed thereto, welcomed the Syrian Government's agreement to the plan, and emphasized the need for the Syrian Government to commit to the full and immediate implementation of its provisions.
2. On 16 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted resolution 7439 approving the draft protocol of the Legal Centre and the mandate of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria, namely to verify implementation of the provisions of the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis and protect Syrian civilians. The resolution requested the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to take such steps as he deemed appropriate to appoint the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission and to make contact with the Syrian Government with a view to signing the protocol.
3. By resolution 7441 of 24 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States requested the Secretary-General of the League to deploy the Observer Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic in order to fulfil its mandate under the protocol immediately on its signature.
4. The Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States signed the protocol on 19 December 2011. The protocol provided for the establishment and deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic of a Mission comprising civilian and military experts from Arab countries and Arab non-governmental human rights organizations. Paragraph 5 stated that the Mission should transmit regular reports on the results of its work to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and the Syrian Government for submission via the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria to the Council of the League at the ministerial level for its consideration and appropriate action.
5. On 20 December 2011, the Council of the League approved the appointment of General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi from the Republic of the Sudan as Head of the Observer Mission.

II. Formation of the Mission

6. The General Secretariat requested Member States and relevant Arab organizations to transmit the names of its candidates for the Mission. On that basis, 166 monitors from 13 Arab countries and six relevant Arab organizations have thus far been appointed.

III. Visit of the advance delegation of the General Secretariat to Syria

7. In preparation for the Mission, an advance delegation of the General Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 December 2011 to discuss the logistical preparations for the Mission.

8. In accordance with the protocol, the Syrian Government confirmed its readiness to facilitate the Mission in every way by allowing the free and safe movement of all of the observers throughout Syria, and by refraining from hindering the work of the Mission on security or administrative grounds. The Syrian Government side also affirmed its commitment to ensuring that the Mission could freely conduct the necessary meetings, to provide full protection for the observers, taking into consideration the responsibility of the Mission if it were to insist on visiting areas despite the warning of the security services; and to allow the entry to Syria of journalists and Arab and international media in accordance with the rules and regulations in force in the country.

IV. Arrival and preliminary visits of the Head of Mission

9. The Head of the Mission, General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi, arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on the evening of Saturday 24 December 2011. He held a series of meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Walid Al-Moualem, and with Syrian Government officials, who stated that they stood prepared to cooperate fully with the Mission and to endeavour to ensure its success, overcoming any obstacles that may arise. The necessary logistical and security arrangements were agreed.

10. The Syrian side stated that there were certain areas that the security protection detail would not be able to enter with the observers for fear of the citizens' reaction. The Head of the Mission replied that that situation would enable the Mission to engage with citizens and opposition parties without government monitoring, thereby removing the citizens' fear of repercussions as a result of communicating with the Mission.

11. The Head of the Mission completed the technical field preparations and secured the necessary transportation and communication devices in order to start work. He met with the observers who arrived successively in Syria and briefed them on their duties and the bases of their work under the protocol. The observers took a special oath for the Mission which had been drafted by the Head.

12. On 27 December 2011, the Head of the Mission and ten observers conducted a preliminary visit to the city of Homs, one of the epicentres of tension, which has seen acts of violence and armed confrontation between the Army and the Syrian opposition. Some security barriers separating districts remain in place.

13. Immediately on arriving in Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Governor of the city, who explained that there had been an escalation in violence perpetrated by armed groups in the city. There had been instances of kidnapping and sabotage of Government and civilian facilities. Food was in short supply owing to the blockade imposed by armed groups, which were believed to include some 3000 individuals. The Governor further stated that all attempts by religious figures and city notables to calm the situation had failed. He made enquiries regarding the possibility of addressing the issue of soldiers and vehicles blocked inside Baba Amr.

14. The Mission visited the residential districts of Baba Amr, Karam Al-Zaytun, Al-Khalidiyya and Al-Ghuta without guards. It met with a number of opposition citizens who described the state of fear, blockade and acts of violence to which they had been subjected by Government forces. At a time of intense exchanges of gunfire among the sides, the Mission witnessed the effects of the destruction wrought on outlying districts. The Mission witnessed an intense exchange of gunfire between the Army and opposition in Baba Amr. It saw four military vehicles in surrounding areas, and therefore had to return to the Governorate headquarters. It was agreed with the Governor that five members of the Mission would remain in Homs until the following day to conduct field work and meet with the greatest possible number of citizens.

15. Immediately on returning from Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Government and insisted that it withdraw military vehicles from the city, put an end to acts of violence, protect civilians, lift the blockade and provide food. He further called for the two sides to exchange the bodies of those killed.

16. At that meeting, the Syrian side agreed to withdraw all military presence from the city and residential areas except for three army vehicles that were not working and had been surrounded, and one that had been taken from the Army by armed groups. The Syrian side requested the Mission's assistance to recover and remove those vehicles in exchange for the release of four individuals, the exchange of five bodies from each side, the entry of basic foods for families in the city, and the entry of sanitation vehicles to remove garbage. It was agreed at the end of the meeting that the Mission would conduct another visit to Homs on the following day in the company of General Hassan Sharif, the security coordinator for the Government side.

17. During that visit, the Mission was introduced to one of the leading figures in the opposition, who acted as media representative of the National Council. An extensive discussion took place regarding the offer of the Syrian Government and the best way to implement the agreement. As a result, the military vehicles were returned and removed; the bodies of those killed were exchanged; trucks entered the city with food; and three detainees and two women were released and returned to their families in the presence of the Mission, thereby calming the situation inside the city.

18. Five days after the monitors were deployed to five zones, the Ministerial Committee requested that the Head of the Mission report on the Mission's work. He travelled to Cairo and gave an oral presentation to the members of the Committee at their meeting of 8 January 2012. It was decided that the work of the Mission should continue and that the Head of the Mission should submit a report at the end of the period determined in the protocol, on 19 January 2012. After the Head's return to Damascus to resume his duties, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists and opposition alike, particularly as a result of statements and media coverage in the wake of the Committee meeting. That did not, however, affect the work of the Mission or its full and smooth deployment across the country.

19. Following its arrival, and to this date, the Mission has received numerous letters from the Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. The letters refer to the material and human losses sustained by Government institutions and offices as a result of what is described as sabotage. They assert that all of the States' vital services have been affected.

V. Deployment of the Observer Mission to Syria

20. The observers were divided into 15 zones covering 20 cities and districts across Syria according to the time frame set out below. The variation in dates was a result of shortcomings in administrative and technical preparations, such as the arrival of cars and personnel. Care was taken to ensure even distribution of observers. Each unit comprised some ten observers of different Arab nationalities. The groups were deployed to Syrian governorates and towns as follows:

- On 29 December 2011, six groups travelled to Damascus, Homs, Rif Homs, Idlib, Deraa and Hama.
- On 4 January 2012, a group travelled to Aleppo.
- On 9 January 2012, two groups went to Deir Al-Zor and Latakia. However, both returned to Damascus on 10 January 2012 owing to attacks that led to the injury of two of the monitors in Latakia and material damage to the cars.
- On 10 January 2012, a group travelled to Qamishli and Hasaka.
- On 12 January 2012, a group travelled to Outer Damascus.
- On 13 January 2012, four groups travelled to Suwaida, Bu Kamal, Deir Al-Zor, Palmyra (Tadmur), Sukhna, Banyas and Tartous.
- On 15 January 2012, two groups travelled to Latakia, Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra.

Annex 1. List of observers, their nationalities and their distribution.

21. The observers were provided with the following:

- A map of the region;
- A code of conduct for observers;
- The duties of the group leaders;
- The duties of the observers;
- Necessary equipment such as computers, cameras and communication devices.

22. An operations room was established at the offices of the League of Arab States in Damascus. The office is open 24 hours a day and is directly linked to the League of Arab States operations room in Cairo and to the groups deployed across Syria. The room receives daily reports from the field teams and conveys special instructions for monitoring. Owing to the volume of work, an additional operations room was opened at the Mission headquarters in Damascus with the task of allocating individuals and assigning committees on follow-up, detainees, the media and financial affairs. It coordinates with the main operations room at the offices of the League of Arab States.

23. In Latakia and Deir Al-Zor, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists. In Latakia, thousands surrounded the Mission's cars, chanting slogans in favour of the President and against the Mission. The situation became out of control and monitors were attacked. Two sustained light injuries and an armoured car was completely crushed. In order to address the matter, the Head of Mission contacted the Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. Nevertheless, the Head of the Mission ordered the immediate return of the two groups to

Damascus. He met the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made a strongly-worded formal protest. The Syrian side strongly condemned the incident and extended a formal apology, explaining that the events were not in any sense deliberate. In order to emphasize the point, the Syrian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs met with the members of the Latakia team and stated that the Syrian Government would address the shortcoming immediately and guarantee the safety and security of observers everywhere. He apologized to them for the unfortunate and unintentional incidents. The members were then assigned to new zones after four days' rest.

VI. Implementation of the Mission's mandate under the protocol

24. The Head of the Mission stresses that this assessment in terms of the provisions of the protocol summarizes the findings of the groups as relayed by group leaders at their meeting with the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012.

A. Monitoring and observation of the cessation of all violence by all sides in cities and residential areas

25. On being assigned to their zones and starting work, the observers witnessed acts of violence perpetrated by Government forces and an exchange of gunfire with armed elements in Homs and Hama. As a result of the Mission's insistence on a complete end to violence and the withdrawal of Army vehicles and equipment, this problem has receded. The most recent reports of the Mission point to a considerable calming of the situation and restraint on the part of those forces.

26. In Homs and Dera'a, the Mission observed armed groups committing acts of violence against Government forces, resulting in death and injury among their ranks. In certain situations, Government forces responded to attacks against their personnel with force. The observers noted that some of the armed groups were using flares and armour-piercing projectiles.

27. In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the Observer Mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against Government forces and civilians that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Examples of those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and injuring others, including women and children, and the bombing of a train carrying diesel oil. In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up, killing two police officers. A fuel pipeline and some small bridges were also bombed.

28. The Mission noted that many parties falsely reported that explosions or violence had occurred in several locations. When the observers went to those locations, they found that those reports were unfounded.

29. The Mission also noted that, according to its teams in the field, the media exaggerated the nature of the incidents and the number of persons killed in incidents and protests in certain towns.

B. Verifying that Syrian security services and so-called *shabiha* gangs do not obstruct peaceful demonstrations

30. According to their latest reports and their briefings to the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012 in preparation for this report, group team leaders witnessed peaceful demonstrations by both Government supporters and the opposition in several places. None of those demonstrations were disrupted, except for some minor

clashes with the Mission and between loyalists and opposition. These have not resulted in fatalities since the last presentation before the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria at its meeting of 8 January 2012.

31. The reports and briefings of groups leaders state that citizens belonging to the opposition surround the Mission on its arrival and use the gathering as a barrier from the security services. However, such incidents have gradually decreased.

32. The Mission has received requests from opposition supporters in Homs and Deraa that it should stay on-site and not leave, something that may be attributable to fear of attack after the Mission's departure.

C. Verifying the release of those detained in the current incidents

33. The Mission received reports from parties outside Syria indicating that the number of detainees was 16,237. It also received information from the opposition inside the country that the number of detainees was 12,005. In validating those figures, the teams in the field discovered that there were discrepancies between the lists, that information was missing and inaccurate, and that names were repeated. The Mission is communicating with the concerned Government agencies to confirm those numbers.

34. The Mission has delivered to the Syrian Government all of the lists received from the Syrian opposition inside and outside Syria. In accordance with the protocol, it has demanded the release of the detainees.

35. On 15 January 2012, President Bashar Al-Assad issued a legislative decree granting a general amnesty for crimes perpetrated in the context of the events from 15 March 2011 through to the issuance of the decree. In implementation of the amnesty, the relevant Government authorities have been periodically releasing detainees in the various regions so long as they are not wanted in connection with other crimes. The Mission has been supervising the releases and is monitoring the process with the Government's full and active coordination.

36. On 19 January 2012, the Syrian government stated that 3569 detainees had been released from military and civil prosecution services. The Mission verified that 1669 of those detained had thus far been released. It continues to follow up the issue with the Government and the opposition, emphasizing to the Government side that the detainees should be released in the presence of observers so that the event can be documented.

37. The Mission has validated the following figures for the total number of detainees that the Syrian government thus far claims to have released:

- Before the amnesty: 4,035
- After the amnesty: 3,569.

The Government has therefore claimed that a total of 7,604 detainees have been released.

38. The Mission has verified the correct number of detainees released and arrived at the following figures:

- Before the amnesty: 3,483
- After the amnesty: 1,669.

The total number of confirmed releases is therefore 5152. The Mission is continuing to monitor the process and communicate with the Syrian Government for the release of the remaining detainees.

D. Confirming the withdrawal of the military presence from residential neighbourhoods in which demonstrations and protests occurred or are occurring

39. Based on the reports of the field-team leaders and the meeting held on 17 January 2012 with all team leaders, the Mission confirmed that all military vehicles, tanks and heavy weapons had been withdrawn from cities and residential neighbourhoods. Although there are still some security measures in place in the form of earthen berms and barriers in front of important buildings and in squares, they do not affect citizens. It should be noted that the Syrian Minister of Defence, in a meeting with the Head of the Mission that took place on 5 January 2012, affirmed his readiness to accompany the Head of the Mission to all sites and cities designated by the latter and from which the Mission suspects that the military presence had not yet been withdrawn, with a view to issuing field orders and rectifying any violation immediately.

40. Armoured vehicles (personnel carriers) are present at some barriers. One of those barriers is located in Homs and some others in Madaya, Zabadani and Rif Damascus. The presence of those vehicles was reported and they were subsequently withdrawn from Homs. It has been confirmed that the residents of Zabadani and Madaya reached a bilateral agreement with the Government that led to the removal of those barriers and vehicles.

E. Confirming the accreditation by the Syrian Government of Arab and international media organizations and that those organizations are allowed to move freely in all parts of Syria

41. Speaking on behalf of his Government, the Syrian Minister of Information confirmed that, from the beginning of December 2011 to 15 January 2012, the Government had accredited 147 Arab and foreign media organizations. Some 112 of those organizations entered Syrian territory, joining the 90 other accredited organizations operating in Syria through their full-time correspondents.

42. The Mission followed up on this issue. It identified 36 Arab and foreign media organizations and several journalists located in a number of Syrian cities. It also received complaints that the Syrian Government had granted some media organizations authorization to operate for four days only, which was insufficient time, according to those organizations. In addition to preventing them from entering the country until they had specified their destinations, journalists were required obtain further authorization once they had entered the country and were prevented from going to certain areas. The Syrian Government confirmed that it grants media organizations operating permits that are valid for 10 days, with the possibility of renewal.

43. Reports and information from some sectors [teams] indicate that the Government places restrictions on the movement of media organizations in opposition areas. In many cases, those restrictions caused journalists to trail the Mission in order to do their work.

44. In Homs, a French journalist who worked for the France 2 channel was killed and a Belgian journalist was injured. The Government and opposition accused each other of being responsible for the incident, and both sides issued statements of condemnation. The Government formed an investigative committee in order to determine the cause of the incident. It should be noted that Mission reports from Homs indicate that the French journalist was killed by opposition mortar shells.

Annex 2. A list of media organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria, according to the official information.

VII. Obstacles encountered by the Mission

A. Monitors

45. Some of the experts nominated were not capable of taking on such a responsibility and did not have prior experience in this field.

46. Some of the observers did not grasp the amount of responsibility that was being placed on them and the importance of giving priority to Arab interests over personal interests.

47. In the course of field work, some observers were unable to deal with difficult circumstances, which are at the core of their duties. Monitors must have certain traits and the specializations required for such work.

48. A number of the observers are elderly, and some of them suffer from health conditions that prevent them from performing their duties.

49. Twenty-two observers declined to complete the mission for personal reasons. Some observers offered unfounded reasons, which were not accepted by the Head of the Mission, while others had a personal agenda.

Annex 3. List of the names of observers who declined to complete the Mission.

50. Some observers reneged on their duties and broke the oath they had taken. They made contact with officials from their countries and gave them exaggerated accounts of events. Those officials consequently developed a bleak and unfounded picture of the situation.

51. Some of the observers in the various zones are demanding housing similar to their counterparts in Damascus or financial reimbursement equivalent to the difference in accommodation rates resulting from the difference in hotel standards or accommodation in Damascus. These issues do not warrant comment.

52. Some observers are afraid to perform their duties owing to the violent incidents that have occurred in certain locations. The unavailability of armoured cars at all the sites and the lack of bulletproof vests have negatively affected some observers' ability to carry out their duties.

Comments of the Head of the Mission concerning the observers

53. Some of the observers, unfortunately, believed that their journey to Syria was for amusement, and were therefore surprised by the reality of the situation. They did not expect to be assigned to teams or to have to remain at stations outside the capital or to face the difficulties that they encountered.

54. Some of the observers were not familiar with the region and its geography. The unavailability of armoured vehicles and protective vests had a negative effect on the spirits of some observers.

55. Some of the observers experienced hostility both from the Syrian opposition and loyalists. This hostility also had a negative effect on their spirits.

56. Despite the foregoing comments, the performance of many of the observers was outstanding and praiseworthy. Those who underperformed will improve with experience and guidance.

B. Security restrictions

57. Although it welcomed the Mission and its Head and repeatedly emphasized that it would not impose any security restrictions that could obstruct the movement of the Mission, the Government deliberately attempted to limit the observers' ability to travel extensively in various regions. The Government also attempted to focus the attention of the Mission on issues in which it is interested. The Mission resisted those attempts and responded to them in a manner that allowed it to fulfil its mandate and overcome the obstacles that stood in the way of its work.

C. Communication equipment

58. The Mission communicates with the various groups by mobile phones and facsimile machines connected to the local Syrian telephone network. Occasional cuts in service prevent the Mission from communicating with the groups.

59. The Mission was equipped with 10 Thuraya satellite phones. Such devices are hard to use inside buildings owing to the difficulty in obtaining a satellite signal. As a result, ordinary phones and fax machines, which are not considered secure communications equipment, were used to send daily reports, instead.

60. The communication equipment the Qatari observers brought with them was held at the Jordanian border, despite demands made by the Head of the Mission to the Syrian authorities to permit entry of that equipment. That notwithstanding, the amount of equipment would not have been enough to meet the needs of all sites and stations.

61. The Mission does not have portable two-way radios for communication between team members. The Chinese Embassy provided 10 such radios as a gift to the Mission. They were used in three sectors only.

62. Internet service is unavailable in some regions, and in other areas it is intermittent, including in the capital.

63. There are no cameras attached to the vehicles used by the Mission, which would facilitate observers' work in dangerous areas.

D. Transportation

64. The Mission has 38 cars at its disposal (23 armoured and 15 non-armoured), including 28 four-wheel drive vehicles and 10 sedans. It should be noted that the Mission's mandate requires the use of armoured four-wheel drive vehicles, given the nature of the Mission. The number of such vehicles currently available does not satisfy the needs of the Mission, particularly for transportation into trouble spots.

65. When it was first deployed, the Mission rented several cars from local sources for use in monitoring operations. However, owing to some acts of violence directed against the field teams, the rental companies recalled those vehicles and their drivers out of fear for their safety.

66. The Mission encountered difficulties in hiring drivers because the opposition groups refused to allow local drivers to enter their areas because they believed the drivers were members of the security services, which forces the observers to drive the vehicles themselves.

67. Some of the observers demanded to use vehicles sent by their countries, a demand that was denied by the Head of the Mission, who allocated the vehicles according to the needs of each zone.

Annex 4. List showing the number, types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.

E. The media

68. Since it began its work, the Mission has been the target of a vicious media campaign. Some media outlets have published unfounded statements, which they attributed to the Head of the Mission. They have also grossly exaggerated events, thereby distorting the truth.

69. Such contrived reports have helped to increase tensions among the Syrian people and undermined the observers' work. Some media organizations were exploited in order to defame the Mission and its Head and cause the Mission to fail.

VIII. Basic needs of the Mission, should its mandate be renewed

- 100 additional young observers, preferably military personnel
- 30 armoured vehicles
- Light protective vests
- Vehicle-mounted photographic equipment
- Modern communications equipment
- Binoculars, ordinary and night-vision

IX. Evaluation:

70. The purpose of the protocol is to protect Syrian citizens through the commitment of the Syrian Government to stop acts of violence, release detainees and withdraw all military presence from cities and residential neighbourhoods. This phase must lead to dialogue among the Syrian sides and the launching of a parallel political process. Otherwise, the duration of this Mission will be extended without achieving the desired results on the ground.

71. The Mission determined that there is an armed entity that is not mentioned in the protocol. This development on the ground can undoubtedly be attributed to the excessive use of force by Syrian Government forces in response to protests that occurred before the deployment of the Mission demanding the fall of the regime. In some zones, this armed entity reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and

citizens, causing the Government to respond with further violence. In the end, innocent citizens pay the price for those actions with life and limb.

72. The Mission noted that the opposition had welcomed it and its members since their deployment to Syria. The citizens were reassured by the Mission's presence and came forward to present their demands, although the opposition had previously been afraid to do so publicly owing to their fear of being arrested once again, as they had been prior to the Mission's arrival in Syria. However, this was not the case in the period that followed the last Ministerial Committee statement, although the situation is gradually improving.

73. The Mission noted that the Government strived to help it succeed in its task and remove any barriers that might stand in its way. The Government also facilitated meetings with all parties. No restrictions were placed on the movement of the Mission and its ability to interview Syrian citizens, both those who opposed the Government and those loyal to it.

74. In some cities, the Mission sensed the extreme tension, oppression and injustice from which the Syrian people are suffering. However, the citizens believe the crisis should be resolved peacefully through Arab mediation alone, without international intervention. Doing so would allow them to live in peace and complete the reform process and bring about the change they desire. The Mission was informed by the opposition, particularly in Dar'a, Homs, Hama and Idlib, that some of its members had taken up arms in response to the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the regime's oppression and tyranny; corruption, which affects all sectors of society; the use of torture by the security agencies; and human rights violations.

75. Recently, there have been incidents that could widen the gap and increase bitterness between the parties. These incidents can have grave consequences and lead to the loss of life and property. Such incidents include the bombing of buildings, trains carrying fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members of the media and fuel pipelines. Some of those attacks have been carried out by the Free Syrian Army and some by other armed opposition groups.

76. The Mission has adhered scrupulously to its mandate, as set out in the protocol. It has observed daily realities on the ground with complete neutrality and independence, thereby ensuring transparency and integrity in its monitoring of the situation, despite the difficulties the Mission encountered and the inappropriate actions of some individuals.

77. Under the protocol, the Mission's mandate is one month. This does not allow adequate time for administrative preparations, let alone for the Mission to carry out its task. To date, the Mission has actually operated for 23 days. This amount of time is definitely not sufficient, particularly in view of the number of items the Mission must investigate. The Mission needs to remain on the ground for a longer period of time, which would allow it to experience citizens' daily living conditions and monitor all events. It should be noted that similar previous operations lasted for several months or, in some cases, several years.

78. Arab and foreign audiences of certain media organizations have questioned the Mission's credibility because those organizations use the media to distort the facts. It will be difficult to overcome this problem unless there is political and media

support for the Mission and its mandate. It is only natural that some negative incidents should occur as it conducts its activities because such incidents occur as a matter of course in similar missions.

79. The Mission arrived in Syria after the imposition of sanctions aimed at compelling to implement what was agreed to in the protocol. Despite that, the Mission was welcomed by the opposition, loyalists and the Government. Nonetheless, questions remains as to how the Mission should fulfil its mandate. It should be noted that the mandate established for the Mission in the protocol was changed in response to developments on the ground and the reactions thereto. Some of those were violent reactions by entities that were not mentioned in the protocol. All of these developments necessitated an expansion of and a change in the Mission's mandate. The most important point in this regard is the commitment of *all sides* to cease all acts of violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its tasks and, ultimately, lay the groundwork for the political process.

80. Should there be agreement to extend its mandate, then the Mission must be provided with communications equipment, means of transportation and all the equipment it requires to carry out its mandate on the ground.

81. On the other hand, ending the Mission's work after such a short period will reverse any progress, even if partial, that has thus far been made. This could perhaps lead to chaos on the ground because all the parties involved in the crisis thus remain unprepared for the political process required to resolve the Syrian crisis.

82. Since its establishment, attitudes towards the Mission have been characterized by insincerity or, more broadly speaking, a lack of seriousness. Before it began carrying out its mandate and even before its members had arrived, the Mission was the target of a vicious campaign directed against the League of Arab States and the Head of the Mission, a campaign that increased in intensity after the observers' deployment. The Mission still lack the political and media support it needs in order to fulfil its mandate. Should its mandate be extended, the goals set out in the protocol will not be achieved unless such support is provided and the Mission receives the backing it needs to ensure the success of the Arab solution.

X. Recommendations:

83. In view of the above and of the success achieved in executing the provision of the protocol, which the Syrian Government pledged to implement, I recommend the following:

- The Mission must be provided with administrative and logistic support in order allow it to carry out its tasks. The Mission must also be give the media and political support required to create an appropriate environment that will enable it to fulfil its mandate in the required manner.
- The political process must be accelerated and a national dialogue must be launched. That dialogue should run in parallel with the Mission's work in order to create an environment of confidence that would contributes to the Mission's success and prevent a needless extension of its presence in Syria.

(Signed) Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa **Al-Dabi**
Head of the Mission

Annexes

- I. List of observers, their nationalities and their distribution.
- II. List of media organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria, according to the official information.
- III. List of the names of observers who declined to complete the Mission.
- IV. List showing the number, types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.

Annex I**League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria****Annex I****Names of the observers of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria**

No.	Name	Nationality	Field team	Remarks
1	Mr. Abdulaziz Saya'a	Algeria	Tartous and Banyas (leader)	
2	Mr. Zerdani Meziane	Algeria	Tartous and Banyas	
3	Col. Jawad Kazem Ja'afar Jassem	Iraq	Tartous and Banyas	
4	Col. Ismail Husayn 'Uwaysh Muhsin Al-Zaidi	Iraq	Tartous and Banyas	
5	Mr. Said Belabad	Algeria	Tartous and Banyas	
6	Mr. Said Sultan Muhammad Ben Sulayman	United Arab Emirates	Qamishli and Hasaka (leader)	
7	Mr. Fethi Belhaj	Tunisia	Qamishli and Hasaka (deputy)	Permanent Arab Committee for Human Rights, Paris
8	Mr. Ahmed Mana'a	Tunisia	Qamishli and Hasaka	Permanent Arab Committee for Human Rights, Paris
9	Mr. Khalid Nasir Muhammad Al-Suwaidi	United Arab Emirates	Qamishli and Hasaka	
10	Mr. Ali Raja'a Ali Al-Saheli	Saudi Arabia	Qamishli and Hasaka	
11	Mr. Muhammad Ahmed Ali Al-Ma'ashi	Saudi Arabia	Qamishli and Hasaka	
12	Mr. Abulrahman Hamud Al-Qadib	Saudi Arabia	Qamishli and Hasaka	
13	Brig. Abbas Wannas 'Abbud	Iraq	Qamishli and Hasaka	
14	Col. Abdulrahman Jassem Hilal Jassem Al-Ameri	Iraq	Qamishli and Hasaka	

15	Brig. Sabah Kazem Ghanem Amer Al-Saudi	Iraq	Qamishi and Hasaka	Permanent Arab Committee for Human Rights, Paris
16	Brig. Adwan Al-Furjan	Jordan	Suwayda (leader)	
17	Brig. Khadr Qalife Hattab Muhammad Al-Sudani	Iraq	Suwayda	
18	Col. Maj. Mahmud Al-Muwali	Jordan	Suwayda	
19	Maj. Fawzi Al-Salmiyet	Jordan	Suwayda	
20	Mr. Adel Ibrahim Hassan	Sudan	Suwayda	
21	Brig. Abbas Hassan 'Aydan Abdul Khaqaji	Iraq	Suwayda	
22	Mr. Khalid Ali Al-Bawsit	Bahrain	Tadmur and Sukhna (leader)	
23	Mr. Abdulaziz Al-Bu Rashid	Bahrain	Tadmur and Sukhna	
24	Ambassador Rashid Loumas	Algeria	Tadmur and Sukhna	
25	Mr. Ashika Bashir	Algeria	Tadmur and Sukhna	
26	Mr. Saud Saif Al-Shamsi	United Arab Emirates	Tadmur and Sukhna	
27	Mr. Ali Rashid Ali Al-Husni	United Arab Emirates	Tadmur and Sukhna	
28	Mr. Ahmed Farhan Thabit	Iraq	Aleppo	
29	Mr. Mazen Fakhir 'Aliwi	Iraq	Aleppo	
30	Mr. Mustafa Al-Mawhad Mustafa	Morocco	Aleppo	
31	Col. Sadiq Al-'Awran	Jordan	Aleppo	
32	Mr. Al-Arbi Mkharek	Morocco	Aleppo	
33	Mr. El Hassan Zahid	Morocco	Aleppo	
34	Mr. Abullatif Al-Jabali	Tunisia	Idlib (leader)	
35	Mr. Mustafa Al-Hasan Taha	Egypt	Idlib	
36	Mr. Al-Bukhari Walid Ahmadi	Mauritania	Idlib	
37	Ms. Nun Ja'afar Yunus	Sudan	Idlib	
38	Mr. Abulqasim 'Uthman Said	Sudan	Idlib	

39	Mr. 'Umar Ahmad Abbas	Sudan	Idlib	Arab Organization for Human Rights
40	Mr. Mohammed Yarqi	Algeria	Deraa (leader)	
41	Mr. Muhammad Mahmud Walid Bubakar	Mauritania	Deraa	
42	Mr. Beltut 'Ashur	Algeria	Deraa	
43	Mr. Rafa'at Merghani Abbas	Sudan	Deraa	
44	Mr. Hashim Hasan Ali	Iraq	Deraa	
45	Mr. Al-Sharif 'Awwad Rahmat	Sudan	Deraa	
46	Mr. Muhammad Nafi'ullah Walid Al-Ni'ma	Mauritania	Deraa	
47	Col. Maj. Ahmad Salim Al-Kharafi	Kuwait	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal (leader)	
48	Mr. Issa Sultan Al-Sulayti	Bahrain	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
49	Mr. Husayn Salman Mattar	Bahrain	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	Arab Organization for Human Rights
50	Col. Khader Jabbar Kayan Khalifa Al-Ka'abi	Iraq	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
51	Mr. Munib Ja'afar Salih Kasid Al-Mahki	Iraq	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
52	Brig. Nidal Muzhir Muhammad Abdullah Al-Rukabi	Iraq	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
53	Lt. Col. Salim Muhammad Al-Hajiri	Kuwait	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
54	Lt. Col. Khalid Nasir Al-Radhan	Kuwait	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
55	Brig. Kazem Jawad Yasir Abdulrida Al-Adili	Iraq	Deir Al-Zor and Bu Kamal	
56	Mr. Ja'afar Kubayda	Sudan	Damascus (leader)	
57	Mr. Juraybi Mhraz	Algeria	Damascus	
58	Mr. Mikati Ali	Algeria	Damascus	
59	Mr. Ibrahim Fadi Al-Mawna	Sudan	Damascus	Arab Organization for Human Rights
60	Mr. Muhammad 'Khalil	Morocco	Damascus	
61	Mr. Muhammad Abduljalil Abdullah Al-Ansari	United Arab Emirates	Damascus	

62	Mr. Lahsan Tahamr	Algeria	Damascus	
63	Mr. Abdullah Al-Tahir	Sudan	Homs (a) (leader)	
64	Mr. Salah Abdulkarim Said Abdullah	Iraq	Homs (a)	
65	Mr. Zaki Koko Khalid Al-Jak	Sudan	Homs (a)	
66	Mr. Al-Jili Al-Bashir	Sudan	Homs (a)	
67	Mr. Al-Sadiq Al-Fadil	Sudan	Homs (a)	
68	Brig. Ihsan Ali Bu'aywi Ali Al-'Anuz	Iraq	Homs (a)	
69	Mr. Aid Abdullah Iyad Al-'Utaybi	Saudi Arabia	Homs (a)	
70	Maj. 'As'ad Abu 'Ata	Jordan	Homs (a)	
71	Mr. Umar Sulayman Khayr Abbas	Iraq	Homs (b) (leader)	
72	Mr. Zaid Muhammad Abdullatif Muhammad Ali	Iraq	Homs (b)	
73	Mr. Salih Walid Said Mahmud	Mauritania	Homs (b)	
74	Mr. Muhammad Hassan Said Muhammad	Iraq	Homs (b)	
75	Mr. Muhammad Al-Bashir Walid Said Hammadi	Mauritania	Homs (b)	Arab Organization for Human Rights
76	Mr. Islam Muhammad Abu Al-Aynayn Sultan	Egypt	Homs (b)	Arab Organization for Human Rights
77	Mr. Mustafa Sulih	Morocco	Homs (b)	Permanent Arab Committee for Human Rights, Paris
78	Mr. Muhammad Husayn Idris	Sudan	Homs (b)	
79	Maj. Muhammad Salim 'Ata Al-Salim	Jordan	Homs (b)	
80	Mr. Salih Ahmad Muhammad Al- Ghamdi	Saudi Arabia	Homs (b)	
81	Brig. Sulayman Hassan Karim Al- Siyahi	Iraq	Homs (b)	
82	Gen. Ali Hassan Hussem Habib Al Habib	Iraq	Latakia (leader)	
83	Col. Akram Husayn Tahir	Sudan	Latakia (deputy)	
84	Gen. Hassan Ali Mali Wali Al-'Ubaydi	Iraq	Latakia	

85	Gen. Muhammad Sa'ud Munir Atya Zayni	Iraq	Latakia
86	Mr. Said Mursi	Egypt	Latakia
87	Mr. Ali Muhammad Abdullah Al-Shahhi	United Arab Emirates	Latakia
88	Mr. Khalid Muhammad Ali Al-Shahhi	United Arab Emirates	Latakia
89	Mr. Muhammad Khalifa Ali Al-Kutbi	United Arab Emirates	Latakia
90	Mr. Abulqadir Azaria Bin Ahmad	Morocco	Latakia
91	Mr. Al-Karimani Muwali Muhammad	Morocco	Latakia
92	Gen. Sadiq Ja'afar Hawzan Al-Wa'ili	Iraq	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra (leader)
93	Mr. Mubarak Said Musafir Al-Khayili	United Arab Emirates	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
94	Gen. Sattar Jabbar Zamil Al-Sa'idi	Iraq	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
95	Mr. Muhammad Said Al-Kutbi	United Arab Emirates	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
96	Lt. Col. Muhammad Nasir Al-Humaynan	Kuwait	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
97	Maj. Dr. Huquqi Yusuf Ya'qub Al-Kandari	Kuwait	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
98	Mr. Khadr Husayn Salih	Iraq	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
99	Mr. Safa' Husayn Ibrahim Radi Al-A'raji	Iraq	Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra
100	Mr. Hadi Rashid Khalid	Qatar	Rif Dimashq (leader)
101	Mr. Muhammad Hamad Jarullah	Qatar	Rif Dimashq

102	Mr. Muhammad Naji 'Awwad	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
103	Mr. Hassan Ali Rashid	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
104	Mr. Muhammad Sayf Muhammad	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
105	Mr. Hamad Tawim Muhammad	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
106	Mr. Said Ahmad Yati Al-Falasi	United Arab Emirates	Rif Dimashq
107	Mr. Ali Sultan Al-Suraydi	United Arab Emirates	Rif Dimashq
108	Maj. Muhammad 'Ubayd Al-'Anzi	Kuwait	Rif Dimashq
109	Mr. Nawaf Mubarak Sayf	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
110	Mr. Dayfullah Hasan Abdullah	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
111	Mr. Abdullah Sultan Abdullah	Qatar	Rif Dimashq
112	Mr. Muhammad Abdulman'am Shadhili Al-Shadhili	Egypt	Hama (leader)
113	Mr. Ghanem Mahiya Al-Harbi	Saudi Arabia	Hama
114	Mr. Muhammad Abdulaziz Mana'a Al-Dusri	Saudi Arabia	Hama
115	Mr. Ahmad Al-Nu'aymi	Bahrain	Hama
116	Mr. Sami Jalil Salim	Iraq	Hama
117	Mr. Ali 'Auda	Iraq	Hama
118	Mr. Fawaz Mukhlid Musafir Al-Mutayri	Saudi Arabia	Hama
119	Mr. Jassim Muhammad Habib 'Issa	Iraq	Hama
120	Mr. Abdulrahim Shalabi	Egypt	Consultative team
121	H. E. Nazih 'Umarayn	Jordan	Consultative team
122	Brig. Muhammad Ahmad Zaza	Jordan	Coordination of operations
123	Mr. Abdullah Said 'Abbud Al-Asri	Saudi Arabia	Operations control
124	Mr. Razzaq Abd Ali Muhammad Al-Tali	Iraq	Committee on detainees

125	Dr. Khalifa Sultan Hamad Al-Kindi	United Arab Emirates	Committee on detainees	
126	Mr. Mazen Ibrahim Al-Tamimi	Bahrain	Committee on detainees	
127	Mr. Ahmad Abdullatif	Sudan	Committee on detainees	
128	Mr. Tariq Al-Mawmani	Jordan	Public information	
129	Mr. Al-Shadhili Hamid	Sudan	Public information	
130	Mr. Abdulrahman Ben 'Umar	Morocco	Advisers	
131	Mr. Tali' Al-Sa'ud Abdullah Al-Atlas	Morocco	Adviser on public information	
132	Mr. Abdullah Muhammad Hassun Haydar Al-Khafaji	Iraq	Transportation	
133	Mr. Hamad Rashid Jabir	Qatar	Administrative support	
134	Mr. Salih Faraj Muhammad	Qatar	Administrative support	
135	Mr. Khalid Salim Salih Al-Saidi	United Arab Emirates	Medical support	
136	Mr. Afifi Abdullatif Muhammad	Sudan	Chief, operations room	
137	Mr. Khalid Bin Rabi'an	Saudi Arabia	Operations control	
138	Mr. Adel Ahmad Sultan	United Arab Emirates	Operations control	
139	Mr. Farijat Bushu'ayb	Morocco	Operations supervisor	
140	Mr. Fahd Muhammad Ali	Qatar	Communications control	
141	Mr. Ali Muhammad Ali	Qatar	Damascus countryside	
142	Ms. Ilham Al-Shajali	Yemen	Team office	League of Arab States
143	Mr. Sidi 'Uthman Walid Al-Sheikh	Mauritania	Team office	

144 Mr. Maslah Salih Maslah Al-Utaybi

Saudi
Arabia

Team office

Annex II

Extent of compliance with paragraph 5 regarding the media

With regard to the media, the protocol states that the Mission should verify that the Syrian Government gives accreditation to Arab and international media and allows them free and unfettered movement throughout Syria.

The Mission teams have followed up the issue. They observed that members of the media were exercising their profession in various regions. They noted some complaints made by members of the media, who said that the Syrian Government had given them four days in which to work in the country, a time frame that they considered insufficient. In view of the complaints, and after the Head of the Mission referred the matter to the Syrian side, the Government agreed to increase the time frame to ten days including the initial four. The media were thus able to work freely with the Mission teams.

While the Mission was present, there was only one killing. The victim was the French journalist Gilles Jacquier, a correspondent for the channel France II, who was walking through Homs. Each side blamed the other for his death and issued statements condemning it. The Government formed a committee to investigate the incident, in which a Belgian journalist was also wounded.

With regard to the decision whether or not to grant entry, the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad stated in his speech of 10 January 2012 that the media were selectively allowed to operate in Syria. However, he did not define the criteria in use. Government figures have indicated that the decision whether or not to grant entry is based on the journalist's position regarding Syria and the events taking place in the country. They stated that only two channels had been barred, namely Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, which the Government believes to be targeting Syria and its system of government.

In regions where media access is difficult, the events are being relayed through high-technology devices incompatible with television, such as mobile phones and simple cameras that give a poor picture on satellite television.

According to the latest information, the Mission teams have observed 44 media outlets and a number of freelance journalists. The Minister of Information, Mr. Adnan Mahmud, stated that 147 Arab and international media outlets had been accredited between the start of December 2011 and 15 January 2012, of which 112 had entered the country, in addition to 90 media outlets that were already based in Syria and had permanent correspondents.

The media outlets observed covering the events in Syria are as follows.

I. Monitoring by teams of observers

	Name	Date of monitoring	Place
1.	Algerian delegation	31/12/2011	Daraa/Damascus
2.	Dubai Network	3/1/2012	Damascus
3.	BBC Arabic Network	5/1/2012	Rif Dimashq

4.	German television	7/1/2012	Damascus
5.	Iranian television	7/1/2012	Damascus
6.	German television	7/1/2012	Damascus
7.	Chinese media delegation (14 media organizations)	7/1/2012	Damascus
8.	Russian television - RT	7/1/2012	Damascus
9.	TSR	8/1/2012	Damascus
10.	CNN	8/1/2012	Damascus
11.	RIL	8/1/2012	Damascus
12.	Associated Press Agency	8/1/2012	Damascus
13.	France 2 Network	9/1/2012	Homs
14.	Italian journalist	9/1/2012	Homs
15.	Lebanese journalist	9/1/2012	Homs
16.	Japanese television	10/1/2012	Daraa
17.	Al-Kawthar Iranian television network	10/1/2012	Damascus
18.	Iraqi network	12/1/2012	Damascus
19.	Canadian media delegation	12/1/2012	Damascus
20.	CBS Network - America	13/1/2012	Damascus
21.	Voice of America Radio	13/1/2012	Damascus
22.	Financial Times	15/1/2012	Damascus
23.	Belgian journalist and writer	15/1/2012	Lattakia
24.	Indonesian media delegation	16/1/2012	Aleppo

II. Arab and foreign media that entered Syria since the signing of the protocol between 19/12/2011 and 16/1/2012, according to official reports:

Name	Date of entry	Remarks
1. Chinese media delegation made up of 14 journalists from different Chinese media outlets	19/12/2011	Monitored by team of observers
2. Japanese TBS Network and Japanese journalist Yuta Furukawa	19/12/2011	
3. Xinhua Chinese News Agency	20/12/2011	
4. Agence France Presse French News Agency	20/12/2011	
5. Yomiuri Japanese newspaper and Japanese journalist Tao Shigeki	26/12/2011	Monitored by team of observers

6.	Belgian journalist Pierre Piccinni	27/12/2011	Monitored by team of observers
7.	New TV - Firas Hatoum, Sa'd al-Din Al-Rifa'i and Ali Sha'ban	27/12/2011	
8.	Algerian National Television	30/12/2011	Monitored by team of observers - part of Algerian delegation
9.	Algerian National Radio	30/12/2011	Part of Algerian delegation
10.	Algerian News Agency	30/12/2011	Part of Algerian delegation
11.	Mainichi Japanese newspaper and Japanese journalist Hiroaki Wada	1/1/2012	
12.	TBS Japanese broadcasting network	3/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
13.	Italian official television	3/1/2012	
14.	French journalist Hervé Degal	3/1/2012	
15.	BBC News Arabic network	3/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
16.	Asahi Shimbun Japanese newspaper	3/1/2012	
17.	RTL German television and Austrian journalist Antonia Rados	4/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
18.	ORF Austrian broadcasting network and correspondent Fritz Orter	4/1/2012	
19.	Aftenposten Norwegian newspaper and Norwegian journalist Jørgen Lohne	5/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
20.	Milli Gazete Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers (Turkish media delegation)
21.	TV5 Turkish network	5/1/2012	Part of the delegation
22.	Milliyet Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
23.	Ihlas Turkish news agency	5/1/2012	" "
24.	Vatan Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
25.	Akşam Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
26.	Vakit Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
27.	Yeni Şafak Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
28.	Today's Zaman English-language Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "

29.	KON Turkish television network	5/1/2012	" "
30.	Hürriyet Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
31.	Star Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
32.	Türk online news site	5/1/2012	" "
33.	STV Turkish television network	5/1/2012	" "
34.	Yeni Asya Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
35.	Bugün Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
36.	Sözcü Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
37.	Cumhuriyet Turkish newspaper	5/1/2012	" "
38.	Guardian British newspaper and British journalist Ian Black	5/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
39.	NHK Japanese Government television and Japanese journalist Yujiru Fuori	6/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
40.	Russian media delegation and journalist Dimitri	6/1/2012	
41.	FR2 French television	7/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
42.	Hebdo Swiss newspaper	7/1/2012	
43.	Lebanese New TV network and correspondent Firas Hatoum	7/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
44.	CNN network; British journalist Dominic Robertson	8/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
45.	Spanish official television and journalist Oscar Fernando Gómez	8/1/2012	
46.	British journalist Elizabeth Cocker	8/1/2012	
47.	Russian journalist Boris Dolgov	8/1/2012	
48.	Polish journalist Marcin Domagala	8/1/2012	
49.	Polish journalist Kornel Sawinski	8/1/2012	
50.	VRI Belgian radio network	8/1/2012	
51.	Newspaper of the Republic of Egypt and journalist Sayyid Husayn Abdul'al	8/1/2012	
52.	Sole 24 Italian newspaper and journalist Alberto Negri	9/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
53.	Italian-Arab Centre and Lebanese journalist Talal Khreis	9/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
54.	La Vie French magazine	10/1/2012	
55.	Bild Zeitung German newspaper and journalist	10/1/2012	

56.	EFE official Spanish news agency and journalist Javier Rodriguez	10/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
57.	CBC Canadian broadcasting network and Canadian journalist Susan Ormiston	10/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
58.	VRT Belgian television and journalist Rudi Vranckx	10/1/2012	
59.	American CBS News network and British journalist Elizabeth Palmer	11/1/2012	
60.	Iranian journalist Mostafa Afzalzadeh	11/1/2012	
61.	British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News, International news department and journalist Timothy Whewell	11/1/2012	
62.	Czech TV; Jan Molacek and Martin Bobin	12/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
63.	Asahi Shimbun Japanese newspaper, editor	13/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
64.	Sky News network and British journalist Jeremy Thompson	13/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
65.	Voice of America radio and television network; American journalist Elizabeth Arrott	13/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
66.	Financial Times newspaper and British journalist Abigail Fielding-Smith	14/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers
67.	Los Angeles Times newspaper and journalist Alexandra Zavis	14/1/2012	Monitored by team of observers

List of Arab and international media representatives who have entered Syria since the start of December 2011

1. The United States channel ABC News: Barbara Jill Waters on 3 December.
2. Delegation of various French media outlets including the journalist Richard Labévière, working from the Institut Français du Proche Orient (IFPO); Professor Eric Denec, a teacher at IFPO; and Saida Ben Hbeibes, on 3 December.
3. The Egyptian journalist Sana Al-Said, on 10 December.
4. Abduh Maghribi, editor of the Egyptian newspaper Al-Anba Al-Duwaliyya on 10 December.
5. Muhammad Al-Fawwal, deputy editor of the newspaper Al-Gumhuriyya, on 10 December.
6. Ilham Al-Maliji, press journalist and analyst, 10 December.
7. Muhammad Mahmud Al-Sayyid of the newspaper Al-Ahram, 10 December.
8. Nura Khalaf, deputy editor of the magazine Hurriyyati, 10 December.

9. Muhammad Said Galal, deputy editor of Akhbar Al-Yawm (Egypt), 10 December.
10. Muhsin Abdulaziz of Al-Ahram, 10 December.
11. Laarbi Usama Al-Dahl, head of the international section, Al-Ahram, 10 December.
12. Ayman Al-Sisi, Al-Ahram, 10 December.
13. Yasir Mishali, deputy editor of Ruz Al-Yusif, 10 December.
14. Rami Al-Maliji of the newspaper Al-Yawm Al-Sabi , 10 December.
15. Shadiya Ahmad Al-Husri of the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Ra'y, 10 December.
16. Lenka Ardnášová, editor of the Slovak newspaper Extra Plus, 11 December.
17. Robert Kolisek of the State publication Tasar, 11 December.
18. Peter Durkovic, a journalist specializing in the Middle East, 11 December.
19. Filip Fostič, editor for Slovak television, 11 December.
20. Martin Kubala of the Slovak channel JOV, 11 December.
21. Josef Durica, editor of a weekly magazine, 11 December.
22. Andrea Emkova, a journalist who publishes in the State media, 11 December.
23. German radio and television, 12 December.
24. Makoto Sasaki of the Japanese network Fuji, 13 December.
25. Joerg Ambruster, Friedre Meissner and Heiko Viehl of the German television channel ARD, 15 December.
26. Dietmar Ossenberg of the German television channel ZDF, 15 December.
27. Takeshi Tsuchiya of the Japanese news agency Kyodo , on 15 December.
28. Giuseppe Bonavolontà of the Italian television channel RAI, 16 December.
29. Sara Firth of the English-language channel Russia Today, 17 December.
30. Mariana Belenkaya of the Arabic-language Russian channel Rusiya Al-Yawm, 17 December.
31. Annalisa Rapanà of the Italian news agency ANSA, 18 December.
The Chinese delegation is composed of 14 journalists from various news outlets and entered the region on 19 December.
32. Zhou Hu, correspondent for Travel News Weekly.
33. Tao Haibin, editor of Global Travel Magazine.
34. Li Wei, editor of Wings of China Magazine.
35. Liu Qiang, editor of Wings of China Magazine.
36. Lin Haidong, editor of Wang Jia Travel.
37. Zou Yinghao, editor of Wang Jia Travel.

38. Zou Qi, editor of Shanghai Media Group.
39. Jin Song, editor of Shanghai Media Group.
40. Bao Gang, editor of Shanghai Media Group.
41. Yu Meng, editor of Century Business Herald.
42. Ruan Yuhong, editor of the website Blashe.
43. Ho Yanguang, editor of China Youth Daily.
44. Qiu Xiaoyu, editor of Chinese international radio.
45. Bao Limin, editor of Youth Reference News.
46. Yuta Furukawa of the Japanese channel TBS, on 19 December.
47. Zheng Kanjun, Li Muizi and Li Jia of the Chinese news agency Xinhua, on 20 December.
48. The French news agency AFP on 20 December.
49. Pierre Piccini, Belgian author and journalist, entered the region on 27 December.
50. Tao Shigeki of the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri, 26 December.
51. Firas Hatoum, Sa'addudin Al-Rifa'i and Ali Sha'aban of the channel Al-Jadid, 27 December.
52. Algerian national television, on 30 December.
53. Algerian national radio, 30 December.
54. Algerian news agency, 30 December.
55. Hiroaki Wada of the Japanese newspaper Mainichi, 1 January 2012.
56. The Japanese channel TBS, 3 January.
57. Italian State television, 3 January.
58. Hervé Degal, French journalist, 3 January.
59. BBC News Arabic, 3 January.
60. Correspondents for the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, 3 January.
61. The Austrian journalist Antonia Rados for the German television channel RTL, 4 January.
62. Fritz Ortner of the Austrian radio and television network ORF, 4 January.
63. Jørgen Lohne of the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 5 January.
64. The Turkish newspaper Milli Gazete, 5 January.
65. The Turkish channel TV5, 5 January.
66. The Turkish newspaper Milliyet, 5 January.
67. The Turkish news agency Ihlas, 5 January.
68. The Turkish newspaper Vatan, 5 January.

69. The Turkish newspaper *Aksam*, 5 January.
70. The Turkish newspaper *Vakit*, 5 January.
71. The newspaper *Yeni Safak*, 5 January.
72. The Turkish English-language newspaper *Today's Zaman*, 5 January.
73. The Turkish television channel *KON*, 5 January.
74. The Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*, 5 January.
75. The Turkish newspaper *Star*, 5 January.
76. The Turkish website *Haber Türk*, 5 January.
77. The Turkish channel *STV*, 5 January 2011.
78. The Turkish newspaper *Yeni Asya*, 5 January.
79. The Turkish newspaper *Bugün*, 5 January.
80. The Turkish newspaper *Sözcü*, 8 January.
81. The Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, 5 January.
82. Ian Black of the UK newspaper *The Guardian*, 5 January.
83. Yutru Futori of the Japanese State television *NHK*, 6 January.
84. The journalist Dimitri of the Russian press delegation, 6 January.
85. The British journalist Dominic Robertson of *CNN*, 8 January.
86. Oscar Fernando Gomez of Spanish State television, 8 January.
87. The French television channel *FR2*, 7 January.
88. The Swiss publication *Hebdo*, 7 January.
89. Firas Hatoum of the Lebanese channel *Al-Jadid*, 7 January.
90. The British journalist Elizabeth Cocker, 8 January.
91. The Russian journalist Boris Dolgov, 8 January.
92. The Polish journalist Marcin Domalaga, 8 January.
93. The Polish journalist Mateusz Piskorski, 8 January.
94. The Polish journalist Kornel Sawinski, 8 January.
95. The Belgian radio *VRT*, 8 January.
96. Sayyid Husayn Abdul'al of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 8 January.
97. Alberto Negri of the Italian newspaper *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 9 January.
98. The Lebanese journalist Talal Khreis of the Italian-Arab Centre, 9 January.
99. The French magazine *La Vie*, 10 January.
100. Julian Reichelt of the German newspaper *Bild Zeitung*, 10 January.
101. Javier Rodríguez of the Spanish State news agency *EFE*, 10 January.

102. Susan Ormiston of the Canadian radio and television network CBC, 10 January.
103. Rudi Vranckx of the Belgian television channel VRT, 10 January.
104. Elizabeth Palmer of the US channel CBS News, 11 January.
105. The Iranian journalist Mostafa Afzalzadeh, 11 January.
106. Tim Whewell of BBC News, international section, 11 January.
107. Jan Molacek and Martin Bubin of Czech television, 12 January.
108. The editor of the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, 13 January.
109. The British journalist Jeremy Thompson of the channel Sky News, 13 January.
110. Elizabeth Arrot of Voice of America radio and television, 13 January.
111. Abigail Fielding-Smith of the British newspaper Financial Times, 14 January.
112. Alexandra Zavis of the newspaper Los Angeles Times, 14 January.

List of Arab and international media granted accreditation for the region since 1 January who have yet to enter the country:

1. Kazuhide Iketaki of the Japanese agency Jiji Press, 26 December 2011.
2. Kazayuki Bandok, Head of office and correspondent for the newspaper Hokkaido Shimbun, accompanied by the Egyptian journalist Mahmud 'Id Mahmud, 26 December.
3. Enrique Rubio of the Spanish agency EFE, 27 December.
4. Salwa Al-Khatib, correspondent for Press TV, 9 December.
5. Jon Anderson, correspondent for the magazine The New Yorker, 28 December.
6. Jeremy Bowen of the BBC, 9 December.
7. Roel Maria Geeraedts of the Dutch channel RTL4, 27 December.
8. Paul Jørgensen of the Norwegian channel TV2, 28 December.
9. William Spindle of the Wall Street Journal, 27 December.
10. Hristo Petrov of the independent news agency Trinity M, 27 December.
11. The Algerian newspaper Al-Khabar, 24 December.
12. The US television channel NBC, 26 December.
13. Vidal Dominguez of the Cuban station Radio Habana, 9 December.
14. Tomas Avenarius of the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 December.
15. The Argentinean journalist Karen Marón, who is currently working for French international radio and the Colombian press, 26 December.
16. Fausto Biloslavo of the newspaper Il Giornale, 28 December.
17. Toru Tomita and Kishi Tumura of the Japanese television channel Nippon, 1 January 2012.

18. The Arabic-language Russian channel Rusiya Al-Yawm, 1 January.
19. The English-language channel Russia Today, 1 January.
20. The Spanish-language Russian station, 1 January.
21. The American author Charles M. Glass, 7 January.
22. Alexandra Zavis of the Los Angeles Times, 7 January.
23. Alice Fordham of the Washington Post, 7 January.
24. Arwa Damon of CNN, 7 January.
25. The American journalist Ayman Mohyeldin of NBC News Cairo, 8 January.
26. The journalist Jorg Armbruster of the German channel ARD.
27. The American journalist Kareem Fahim of the New York Times, 8 January.
28. The British journalist and academic James Harkin, 8 January.
29. The Chinese journalist Li Lianxing of the newspaper China Daily, 12 January.
30. Karim Al-Jawhari of the Austrian channel ORF, 12 January.
31. Toshihiro Fuji of the Japanese channel NHK, 12 January.
32. Wang Chu of the Chinese news agency Xinhua, 12 January.
33. Abigail Fielding-Smith of the Financial Times, 12 January.
34. Claudie Abi Hanna of the Lebanese channel Al-Hurra, 12 January.
35. Michael Robert Peel of the Financial Times, 12 January 2012.
36. Jan Eikelboom of Dutch television, 12 January.
37. Ahmad Jadullah Hasan Salem and Maryam Qar'uni of Reuters, 13 January.

Annex III**Names of observers who withdrew from the League of Arab States
Observer Mission**

	Name	Nationality	Field team	Comments	Comments
1	Muhammad Husayn Umar	Djibouti	Homs A	Qatar Charity	Departed
2	Anwar Abdulmalik	Algeria	Homs A		Departed
3	Muhammad bin Yusuf Al-Nafati	Tunisia	Idlib		Departed
4	Ahmad Abdullah Muhamamd Abdullah	Egypt	Idlib		Departed
5	Abdulhamid Al- Wali	Morocco			Departed
6	Jamal Hamid Barakat	Egypt	Hama	Arab Human Rights Organization	Departed
7	Nabil Abdulmuhsin Hasan Al- Shalabi	Egypt	Hama	Arab Human Rights Organization	Departed
8	Hadi Ali Muhammad Al- Tayyib	Egypt	Hama	Arab Human Rights Organization	Departed
9	Ibrahim Abdullah Al- Sulayman	Saudi Arabia	Hama	Arab Human Rights Organization	Departed
10	Karim Abdulmuhsin Hasan Al- Shalabi	Egypt	Homs A	Arab Human Rights Organization	Departed
11	Manina bint Muhammad Salim	Mauritania	Deraa	Arab Human Rights Organization	Departed
12	Hisham Bnay ish	Morocco	Damascus		Departed
13	Isam Abdulrahman	Sudan	Damascus		Departed

14	Muhammad Salim Muhammad Rashid Al-Ka'bi	United Arab Emirates	Deraa		Departed
15	Yahiya Abdulmuhsin Al-Itabi	Iraq	Deraa	Arab Human Rights Organization	Left without the Mission's permission and at his own expense
16	Isam Mansur Muhammad Muqdad	Jordan	Coordinator	Arab Committee on Human Rights	Departed
17	Muhammad Uthman Al-Sudani	Tunisia	Aleppo		Departed
18	Sabr Al-Rawashida	Jordan	Aleppo		Departed
19	Jalal bin Ibrahim Al-Samusi	Tunisia	Idlib		Departed
20	Muhammad bin Husayn bin Yusuf	Tunisia	Idlib		Departed
21	Muhammad Salah Ali Shawar	Egypt	Idlib	Egyptian National Council on Human Rights	Departed
22	Hadi Al-Yami	Saudi Arabia	Committee on detainees	Arab Committee on Human Rights	Special leave for five days

Annex IV

Vehicle fleet

League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

No.	Country	Land Cruiser		Mercedes		Nissan		Cadillac		Total	Remarks
		Armoured	Regular	Armoured	Regular	Armoured	Regular	Armoured	Regular		
1	Iraq	7		10						17	23 armoured
2	Qatar		5				4 (Toyota)	1		10	15 g armoured
3	Saudi Arabia	8								8	
4	United Arab Emirates						6			6	
Total armoured vehicles		12	5	10			10	1		38	

Vehicles used by the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

No.	Country	Make	Plate number	Regular/ armoured	Type	Sector	Remarks
1	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2192	Regular	4 x 4	Deraa	
2	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2193	Regular	4 x 4	Homs (by)	
3	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2194	Regular	4 x 4	Hama	
4	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2195	Regular	4 x 4	Hama	
5	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2196	Regular	4 x 4	Idlib	
6	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2197	Regular	4 x 4	Swaida	
7	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2198	Regular	4 x 4	Damascus	Ready for deployment
8	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2199	Regular	4 x 4	Qamishli	
9	Qatar	Land Cruiser	2201	Regular	4 x 4	Damascus	Ready for deployment
10	Qatar	Cadillac	2212	Armoured	4 x 4	Damascus countryside	
11	Saudi Arabia	GMS	2231	Armoured	4 x 4	Homs	
12	Saudi Arabia	GMS	2232	Armoured	4 x 4	Homs	
13	Saudi Arabia	GMS	2233	Armoured	4 x 4	Qamishli	
14	Saudi Arabia	GMS	2234	Armoured	4 x 4	Hama	
15	Saudi Arabia	GMS	2235	Armoured	4 x 4	Ladmir	
16	United Arab Emirates	Nissan	2214	Regular	4 x 4	Latakia	Inoperable
17	United Arab Emirates	Nissan	2215	Regular	4 x 4	Latakia	
18	United Arab Emirates	Nissan	2216	Regular	4 x 4	Qamishli	
19	United Arab Emirates	Nissan	2217	Regular	4 x 4	Latakia	Inoperable
20	United Arab Emirates	Nissan	2222	Regular	4 x 4	Ladmir	
21	United Arab Emirates	Nissan	2223	Regular	4 x 4	Latakia	
22	Iraq	Mercedes	2202	Armoured	Station wagon	Homs (by)	
23	Iraq	Mercedes	2203	Armoured	Station wagon	Damascus countryside	
24	Iraq	Mercedes	2204	Armoured	Station wagon	Aleppo	
25	Iraq	Mercedes	2205	Armoured	Station wagon	Homs (by)	
26	Iraq	Mercedes	2206	Armoured	Station wagon	Swaida	
27	Iraq	Mercedes	2207	Armoured	Station wagon	Deraa	
28	Iraq	Mercedes	2208	Armoured	Station wagon	Deir Al Zor	
29	Iraq	Mercedes	2209	Armoured	Station wagon	Hama	
30	Iraq	Mercedes	2210	Armoured	Station wagon	With the team	
31	Iraq	Mercedes	2211	Armoured	Station wagon	Homs (by)	
32	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2224	Armoured	4 x 4	Latakia	
33	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2225	Armoured	4 x 4	Damascus	Undergoing maintenance
34	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2226	Armoured	4 x 4	Idlib	
35	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2227	Armoured	4 x 4	Raqqa and Al-Thawra	
36	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2228	Armoured	4 x 4	Raqqa and Al-Thawra	
37	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2229	Armoured	4 x 4	Deir Al Zor	
38	Iraq	Land Cruiser	2230	Armoured	4 x 4	Raqqa and Al-Thawra	

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
31 January 2012

Original: English

**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo****I. Introduction and Mission priorities**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and requested that I report at regular intervals on the implementation of its mandate. It covers the activities of UNMIK, and developments related thereto, from 16 October 2011 to 15 January 2012.

2. The priorities of the Mission, to promote security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo and in the region, remain unchanged. However, the possibility of increased challenges to the fulfilment of these priorities may merit heightened attention in 2012. In furtherance of its goals, UNMIK continues to intensify its constructive engagements with Pristina and Belgrade, the communities in Kosovo, and regional and international actors. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) continue to perform their roles within the framework of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). In line with the Security Council presidential statement of 26 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/44) and my report of 24 November 2008 (S/2008/692), the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) operates under the overall authority and within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations. OSCE, KFOR and EULEX continue to cooperate and coordinate with UNMIK. The United Nations agencies, funds and programmes also continue to work closely with the Mission.

II. Political developments and northern Kosovo

3. Partly as a consequence of positions and actions taken during the previous reporting period by Pristina, the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade, the situation in northern Kosovo continues to be tense and potentially unstable, influencing much of the present political discourse. It has also significantly impacted the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade facilitated by the European Union, as well as the discussions on the European perspective of the region. On 9 December, the Council of the European Union postponed its decision on Serbia's European Union candidate status until March 2012, with some members making specific reference to the situation in northern Kosovo. Kosovo was discussed on 5 December, with the



European Council envisaging in its conclusions the opening of a dialogue on visa liberalization and access to some additional European Union programmes.

4. As a part of the extensive efforts to de-escalate tensions in northern Kosovo, my Special Representative met with local leaders, as well as with leaders both in Belgrade and Pristina, urging them to use their influence to discourage violence and to return matters back to the political arena and the ongoing processes of dialogue and diplomacy. Alongside top level contacts, UNMIK continued to facilitate a new security coordination forum on the ground in northern Kosovo, involving KFOR, EULEX, OSCE and northern Kosovo Serb leaders. This forum has contributed substantially to the reduction of misunderstandings and miscommunication. UNMIK efforts on the ground repeatedly served as a critical element helping to contain and de-escalate the confrontations that took place during the reporting period.

5. During the first half of the reporting period, Kosovo Serbs in the north kept and reinforced their roadblocks at gates 1 and 31 and erected additional roadblocks along other routes to protest the deployment of Kosovo customs and border police officers at the gates. Northern Kosovo Serbs also upgraded bypass routes, which were increasingly used for vehicular traffic. The situation resulted in numerous demonstrations and, on occasion, violent clashes with KFOR, when the latter's troops attempted to dismantle the barricades. While the removal of some barricades occurred peacefully, in populated areas there was significant resistance by local Serbs in some instances. On 23 November, KFOR attempted to clear a roadblock on the Mitrovica bypass at Dudin Krš. When KFOR proceeded to dismantle the barricade, a large number of Serbs converged on the scene. A significant number of injuries on both sides resulted from the ensuing clashes with the KFOR soldiers.

6. In an incident on 28 November at a roadblock near the village of Jagnjenica, which lies on a key route connecting Zubin Potok and Zvečan/Zveçan, KFOR initially cleared one segment prior to an extended clash involving the use of tear gas, water cannons and batons. Unknown individuals fired from a wooded position nearby, wounding two KFOR soldiers. KFOR reported that it responded by firing live ammunition into the air. A total of 15 Kosovo Serbs were admitted to the northern Mitrovica hospital, while 20 others were treated in the health centre in Zubin Potok for injuries inflicted during the clashes; 30 KFOR soldiers were injured in the incident. With UNMIK encouragement, further negotiations resulted in mutual agreement on the removal of the barricade, and its replacement by a joint KFOR KPS checkpoint, which has been in operation there since 5 December.

7. On 29 November, following the Jagnjenica incident, Serbian President Boris Tadić publicly called for the dismantling of the barricades. Although this message was disregarded by some municipal leaders in the north – notably those belonging to Serbian opposition parties – it was heeded by others, and contributed to the removal of roadblocks in Leposaviq/Leposavić municipality.

8. Alongside messages from Belgrade and the international community, UNMIK interventions on the ground proved again to be a significant contribution to the restoration of freedom of movement for KFOR throughout northern Kosovo. In contrast, freedom of movement for EULEX continues to be severely hampered by the northern Kosovo Serbs, who currently allow passage by EULEX only on a case-by-case basis. Towards the end of the reporting period, a compromise arrangement allowing for EULEX movement, advocated by my Special Representative, was applied successfully in several instances.

9. The northern Kosovo Serbs remain firm in their opposition to EULEX transporting Kosovo border police and customs officers to gates 1 and 31. Although these gates are open, alternate routes continue to be heavily used. KFOR has closed off some of these routes, while others remain open under KFOR control for vehicles weighing less than 3.5 tons. Due to the mountainous terrain, KFOR is not in a position to control all unauthorized routes and crossings.

10. On 9 November, tensions turned into violence in the ethnically mixed Kroi i Vitakut Brdiani neighbourhood of Mitrovica. A Kosovo Serb juvenile accused of stealing home construction materials was assaulted by a group of Kosovo Albanians in the area. Three Kosovo Serb males, including one off-duty Kosovo police officer, arrived immediately after the initial assault and requested the Kosovo police to respond. Following the arrival of Kosovo police, unknown person(s) fired automatic weapons at the three Kosovo Serbs, which resulted in the death of one and serious injury to a second. A joint EULEX and Kosovo police investigation is ongoing and the Kosovo police have opened a police substation following calls by UNMIK, both before and after the incident, for an increased police presence in the area.

11. On 13 December, a previously announced Russian aid convoy of 25 trucks, accompanied by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Serbia, sought to enter Kosovo through gate 1 with a delivery of electricity generators, blankets, clothes, food and cooking equipment. Although the convoy's departure from the Russian Federation had been communicated to EULEX in advance, disagreements arose over how to ensure it would be escorted appropriately. After three days of negotiation, including between European Union and representatives of the Russian Federation in Brussels, the convoy finally proceeded on 16 December to a warehouse of the Serbian Red Cross in Dolan Doljane village, Zvečan/Zvečan, for distribution to the intended beneficiaries. It was escorted by three EULEX vehicles, which had reached gate 1 through alternate roads in Serbia proper.

12. Towards the end of the reporting period, the municipal authorities in northern Kosovo called for a public referendum on the question "Do you accept the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo?" and announced that it would take place on 14 and 15 February. The Serbian Government has publicly opposed the holding of such a referendum, calling it unnecessary and beyond the constitutional competencies of municipal governments. Some Kosovo Serbs in central and southern Kosovo are also opposed to the referendum. Towards the end of the reporting period, it remained unclear whether the referendum would be held as planned.

13. Throughout the reporting period, Pristina officials adopted a more conciliatory rhetoric towards the north. Prime Minister Thaçi, in particular, expressed readiness to meet northern Kosovo Serbs in order to hear their concerns and "to assist them more than Belgrade does". He stressed that his government was not in conflict with them and that it could be "as creative as necessary" in meeting their needs. His statements in favour of integration and implementation of the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan were echoed by President Jahjaga.

14. On 6 and 7 January, Serbian President Boris Tadić attended the Orthodox Christmas Day service at the Visoki Dečani monastery in Kosovo. The opposition Vetëvendosje movement organized protests against the Tadić visit in three municipalities: Pejë/Peć, Deçan/Dečan and Podujevë/Podujevo. Several hundred Vetëvendosje supporters blocked roads to Deçan/Dečan and the Pejë/Patriarchate and

threw stones and petrol at Tadić's convoy. In a television interview aired during his visit to Kosovo, Tadić called for a compromise solution to be found for the Kosovo issue, among other things, renouncing the notion of partition along ethnic lines. President Tadić went on to call for greater creativity in finding solutions, emphasizing the four Serbian priorities he first outlined during the session of the Security Council dedicated to Kosovo on 30 November.

15. On 14 January, Vetëvendosje also staged protests in the vicinity of gates 3 and 5 against the import of Serbian products; attempts to block the flow of traffic led to clashes with police and resulted in injuries on both sides. Opposition parties and civil society organizations have alleged that the police used excessive force, while the Kosovo authorities have defended the actions of the police in the face of unlawful demonstrations. A review of the police response is being conducted with EULEX support.

16. On 17 October the lead prosecutor of the EULEX Special Investigative Task Force on the allegations of organ trafficking, as contained in the Council of Europe report of December 2010 by Senator Dick Marty, formally assumed his duties. He made his first consultative visits to Pristina from 18 to 21 October, to Belgrade from 24 to 26 October and to Tirana from 9 to 11 November, where the respective authorities' official support to and full cooperation with the Task Force were reconfirmed.

III. Engagement between Pristina and Belgrade

17. Following bilateral contacts between the European Union facilitator and the parties, as well as meetings of the technical working groups, the European Union-facilitated dialogue resumed at the end of November, following a three-month hiatus. The seventh and eighth rounds of the dialogue were held in Brussels on 21 and 22 November and from 30 November to 2 December.

18. Partly as a response to developments on the ground, the issue of operational management of crossing points was taken up; agreement was reached during the eighth round on the application of the European Union concept of the integrated management of crossing points. As a result, the parties committed gradually to set up joint, integrated management posts at all common crossing points, as soon as practically possible, in line with European best practices. This will include a EULEX presence in line with the mandate of the EULEX mission. Also according to the agreement, a technical protocol will be signed, and a tripartite group, chaired by the European Union, will oversee implementation.

19. The last two meetings of 2011 also helped to carry forward the implementation of earlier agreements. As a result, at the beginning of December the first original civil registry book from the municipality of Lipjan was copied and certified by EULEX in an operational follow-up to the agreement reached in early July, and was subsequently handed over from Belgrade to Pristina, through EULEX, on 6 December. With regard to cadastre records, the agreement reached in September was followed up by meetings between the parties on more detailed, operational matters required for its implementation.

20. On 26 December, implementation began of the 2 July understanding on freedom of movement, which since July had been elaborated by working groups and

reviewed in the eighth round of the dialogue. Under these arrangements, residents of Kosovo and of Serbia are provided with an entry/exit document issued to them at the crossing point, enabling them to travel in and through their respective areas of control with accepted identity documents. Three crossing points (gates 1, 3 and 5) are opened for passage under this scheme. For onward travel to third destinations, two crossings, one between Serbia and Hungary (Horgoš) and one between Serbia and Croatia (Batrović), are opened for entering/leaving Serbia proper. This arrangement is expected to be gradually applied at all other crossings.

21. Also under the agreement, cars with Serbian ("SRB") number plates issued to residents of Serbia proper and cars with "KS" vehicle licence plates being reissued in Kosovo to those requesting them are to be able to travel freely. For people travelling in vehicles with the current "RKS" vehicle licence plates of the Kosovo authorities in circulation since the beginning of 2011, temporary vehicle licence plates valid for Serbia proper are made available by the Serbian authorities upon entry at the crossing points.

22. An insurance scheme is operational on each side, though immediate concerns have been raised about the price, which is proving to be prohibitive for individuals on both sides. The parties have agreed to continue working towards a commercial arrangement on mutual vehicle insurance coverage that could help to address the problem of the prohibitive insurance costs currently imposed.

23. Following agreement in principle on the acceptance of university diplomas, reached at an earlier session on 2 July, the parties agreed on 22 November that the European University Association will verify and certify diplomas issued by universities of each party for use by the other in the context of further education and public employment. A committee of European academic experts established by the Association will carry out the certification.

IV. Economy

24. Kosovo's low degree of integration into the global goods and financial markets has kept its economy largely unaffected by financial turbulence in the Euro area. Continued growth in imports, tax revenues and credit to the private sector were recorded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during 2011. IMF estimated gross domestic product growth in Kosovo in 2011 at 5 per cent, but forecasts a lower rate of some 4 per cent for 2012.

25. In December, IMF concluded that the fiscal performance of the Kosovo institutions was largely satisfactory under the IMF Staff-Monitored Programme, with strong collection of value-added tax and non-tax revenues, including a €15 million dividend from Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo (PTK). Expenditures remained below the maximum level allowed under the Staff-Monitored Programme, with spending cuts of €60 million compensating for the failure to privatize PTK in 2011. A further review is due in mid-February, and continued strong performance under the Staff-Monitored Programme may pave the way for a return to an IMF-supported, rather than IMF-managed, programme for 2012.

26. On 1 January 2012, the law adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Privatization Agency-Related Matters

entered into force. As noted in my previous two reports, this law, together with the Law on the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, which has been in force since September 2011, will significantly weaken the protection of privatization funds and expose the funds to the possibility of improper use. Overall, international involvement in and oversight of the privatization and liquidation processes, which was previously assured by a majority of international judges appointed by EULEX, is being acutely curtailed by this legislation, and international judicial oversight in particular is now limited to an appeals panel. This constitutes a departure from the privatization and Special Chamber framework established by UNMIK. This notwithstanding, EULEX is of the opinion that the majority international presence in the appeals panel will provide the necessary safeguards to the process.

V. Security

27. In general, there was an overall reduction in common crimes from the previous year. The Kosovo police conducted successful operations against individuals involved in organized crime, human trafficking and drug trafficking.

28. However, this overall reduction did not have a direct impact on the security situation during the reporting period. The situation north of the Ibar River was tense owing to the developments described above. South of the Ibar River, there was a slight decrease from the previous reporting period in the number of low level incidents affecting the minority communities, including intimidation, assault, thefts, property-related issues and the vandalizing of Serbian Orthodox churches and cemeteries, as well as cars with Serbian licence plates in mixed and mainly Kosovo Albanian areas.

29. Although many of these incidents are considered minor and not directly related to ethnic issues, they continue to affect negatively the perception of security. This is particularly the case when the incidents are not perceived to be followed up by effective action on the part of law enforcement bodies.

30. The most significant incidents during the period were two incidents of shooting fatalities. On 20 October 2011, in the ethnically mixed village of Dobruša (Dobruša (Istog Istok municipality), following a property dispute, a Kosovo Albanian male opened fire on three Kosovo Serb males with an automatic rifle, killing one and injuring two others. The assailant was detained by the Kosovo police and has been charged. The second fatality, reported in paragraph 10 above, is under investigation.

VI. Rule of law

31. UNMIK continued to monitor activities and exercise some responsibilities in the area of rule of law, as well as to cooperate at the technical level with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo and the Ministry of Justice of Serbia. The impasse between the Ministry of Justice of Kosovo and the Ministry of Justice of Serbia on mutual legal assistance persisted, with the Kosovo Ministry not processing any documents from the Serbian Ministry received through UNMIK and the Serbian Ministry not processing any documents received directly from the Kosovo Ministry. The technical arrangement on mutual legal assistance

signed on 12 August between EULEX and the Kosovo Ministry of Justice has yet to be accepted by non-recognizing States. UNMIK has therefore continued to facilitate the submission of mutual legal assistance requests from non-recognizing countries to the Kosovo Ministry of Justice.

32. During the reporting period, progress continued to be seen on the issue of missing persons, with direct support and engagement by UNMIK. This issue is a major obstacle to reconciliation between the communities. The tenth public meeting of the Belgrade-Pristina Working Group on Missing Persons was held in Belgrade on 24 November, chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Participants included the Deputy to my Special Representative, Kosovo and Serbian delegations, family representatives and relevant international organizations. Meanwhile, during the reporting period, the remains of five individuals were identified. ICRC estimates some 1,797 individuals remain missing from the conflict.

33. UNMIK further continued to provide document certification services, both to Kosovo residents and at the request of non-recognizing States, primarily for the certification of civil status, pension and academic documents.

34. UNMIK facilitated the interaction of the Kosovo authorities with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) on a daily basis. During 2011, 188 individual asylum requests were submitted to the Kosovo Ministry of Internal Affairs. The top five countries of origin were Afghanistan, Algeria, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia. No status of refugee, subsidiary or temporary protection was attributed in 2011 in the court of first instance or the court of appeals.

35. New Kosovo legislation on witness protection will enter into force in September 2012. Protecting witnesses from threats or intimidation has been, and remains, one of the greatest challenges for the judicial authorities in Kosovo. Instances of witness intimidation continue to hamper the proper functioning of the justice system.

VII. Returns and communities

36. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported 271 individual voluntary returns during October, November and December, making an annual total for 2011 of 1,143, including 457 Serbs; 118 Roma; 364 Ashkali Egyptians; 60 Bosniaks; 106 Goranis; 28 Albanians in a minority situation, 1 Turk and 9 Montenegrins. The total number of returns for 2011 is therefore down 51 per cent when compared to 2010 (2,314 persons).

37. UNHCR, as well as its implementing partners and donor States, continued to provide financial and other support to Kosovo municipalities for conducting outreach activities to displaced persons outside and within Kosovo, including go-and-inform and go-and-see visits. Several returns assistance projects are continuing; they include a European Union-funded return and reintegration project that began providing technical support to the Ministry for Communities and Returns and five selected municipalities in November, along with direct return and reintegration assistance to families who are willing to return to Kosovo.

38. Forced repatriations from host countries (mainly in Western Europe) continued in significant numbers during the reporting period. By the end of the year, UNHCR

had recorded a total of 3,186 persons forcibly returned to Kosovo from West European countries during 2011. Among these, 639 individuals belong to minority communities as defined under the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines. UNHCR assesses that there are few prospects for sustainable integration for minorities forcibly returned to Kosovo, inter alia, because of the lack of personal documentation, housing, employment and family support, as well as perceptions of insecurity in the places to which they are being returned.

39. On 20 December, the first go-and-see visit to Gjakovë/Dakovica municipality in many years was organized for seven Kosovo Serbs currently displaced in Montenegro by the Danish Refugee Council in coordination with UNHCR and the municipality. The Danish Refugee Council also organized a go-and-see visit for 10 Kosovo Serbs displaced in Serbia to Doberdoli/Dobri Do village in Pejë/Pec municipality.

40. During the reporting period, members of all communities throughout Kosovo regularly cited electricity and potable water shortages and poor infrastructure as major points of concern. UNMIK has continued to facilitate interaction and dialogue among all communities in Kosovo, as well as to urge public officials and leaders to improve public services and outreach. In response to the fatal shooting of a Kosovo Serb visiting his property in western Kosovo, as mentioned in paragraph 30 above, local Kosovo Serb leaders petitioned the Kosovo institutions and international community representatives for improved law enforcement responses. Similar petitions were forwarded from other minority areas, including Zallq/Zaç and Dragash/Dragaš.

VIII. Cultural and religious heritage

41. International stakeholders continued bilateral consultations with the parties to find a consensual formula to preserve the efficient mechanism of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission. The European Union's Facilitator for the protection of religious and cultural heritage of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo continued to engage with all stakeholders, trying to bridge differences over the future of the Commission between the Kosovo authorities, on one side, and the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Institute of the Protection of Cultural Monuments in Belgrade, on the other side.

42. UNMIK continued monitoring security arrangements being provided to key Serbian Orthodox sites. Three sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Visoki Dečani, Dević and the Peć Patriarchate, remain under the permanent protection of KFOR. Other Orthodox patrimonial sites are guarded by the Kosovo police, and while several acts of vandalism and theft were recorded during the reporting period, sites where protection duties have been taken over by the Kosovo police have generally recorded a drop in such incidents.

43. UNMIK continued its engagement with the Pejë/Pec municipal authorities and the Serbian Orthodox Church in the hope of finding an amicable solution for projects being implemented by the municipality in the vicinity of the Peć Patriarchate, a site inscribed on United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage List. The Peć Patriarchate called upon the municipality to suspend construction of a bicycle and pedestrian route traversing the Special Protective Zone around the monastery until a compromise agreement is

reached. The Serbian Orthodox Church criticized the municipal authorities for proceeding without consulting them, recalling a similar problem that occurred recently with the construction of the water reservoir and the pumping station near the monastery. Kosovo Serbs from the nearby Levošhe/Ljevosa village also oppose the project, due to security concerns. After several meetings and joint assessments of the projects between the municipality and the Patriarchate, a compromise solution appears likely. UNMIK also facilitated the activities of UNESCO in Kosovo. In the reporting period, UNESCO started the first phase of fresco restoration in Bogorodica Ljeviska Church, funded by combined donations of several countries.

IX. Human rights

44. During the reporting period, the Ombudsperson Institution underwent an internal restructuring in order to improve its performance. A new departmental organization of the Institution takes into account the responsibilities of the newly appointed Deputies to the Ombudsperson, for anti-discrimination, gender equality, children's rights, community rights, people with disabilities, prevention of torture, and the environment.

45. Following the endorsement by the Assembly of Kosovo of the five candidates proposed by the Ombudsperson Institution for the posts of Deputy Ombudsperson, the new officials took office on 1 November, concluding a protracted appointment process. Three of the deputies are from the Kosovo Albanian community, and one each from the Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Turkish communities.

46. The Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo reported on cases of intimidation and violence against journalists at a news conference on 5 December, noting that during 2011 it had publicly responded on 27 cases of violations of the rights of journalists, down from 32 cases in 2010. Of the 27 cases, 9 involved physical violence against journalists and 7 involved threats against journalists, including a threat by a member of the Assembly of Kosovo.

47. As at 31 December 2011, the UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel had completed 166 of a total of 525 cases. In the course of the year 2011, the Panel closed 100 cases, compared to 37 in 2010.

48. Following a letter from the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, UNMIK conveyed on 16 December 2011 a request from the Special Rapporteur to the Government for follow-up information regarding recommendations made in the report of 9 December 2009 of the Special Rapporteur after her mission to Kosovo in 2009.

49. UNMIK and United Nations partner agencies participated in events for the global campaign "16 days of activism against gender violence" from 25 November to 10 December, coordinated by the Agency for Gender Equality. Over 30 separate activities were held in Kosovo to raise awareness about gender-based violence and to campaign for improved institutional responses. It is estimated that less than 50 per cent of domestic violence incidents are reported in Kosovo, with institutional support for victims in need of significant strengthening.

X. External representation and regional cooperation

50. During the reporting period, UNMIK continued to facilitate the participation of Kosovo representatives in a variety of international and regional meetings in the context of the Energy Community, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the South-East Europe Transport Observatory, the European Common Aviation Area, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Regional Cooperation Council, as well as in the subject areas of justice and home affairs, agriculture, migration, social economy, civil documentation and the information society.

51. The CEFTA Experts and Ministerial Joint Committee meetings held on 23 November in Paris presented a good occasion to review the 2011 CEFTA chairmanship year, during which UNMIK facilitation enabled most of the annual objectives to be accomplished and the full 2011 schedule of meetings to be held.

XI. Observations

52. Developments during the last quarter of 2011 have further demonstrated that risks to peace and stability from the Kosovo issue continue to confront the people on the ground and the international community. Optimistic assumptions that durable solutions might simply evolve from the status quo, without a strong vision for the way forward and a united engagement of the international community, are belied by dynamics on the ground, in particular in northern Kosovo. Although tensions in the area subsided by the end of the reporting period, I remain concerned over the volatile situation there, which carries a continued risk of provocations and of an escalation of inter-ethnic tensions.

53. At the same time, the European Union-facilitated dialogue in Brussels has shown that practical agreements to alleviate daily problems faced in Kosovo are achievable. I commend the parties for restarting the dialogue under challenging circumstances, and for demonstrating renewed faith in a process designed to resolve differences in a peaceful manner. I am pleased that some positive results were achieved during the intensive sessions held in November and early December, and that there is now visible progress in the implementation of previously reached agreements. The agreement on the integrated management of crossing points, although not implemented yet, represents an important breakthrough that can lead to the full normalization of the situation at the northern gates, and the restoration of full freedom of movement throughout the north. I therefore reiterate the support of the United Nations to the continued engagement of the parties at all levels and urge them to maintain their commitment to dialogue.

54. I also take special note of recent encouraging, albeit tentative, signals from both Pristina and Belgrade in acknowledging the importance of positive rhetoric. Specifically, I welcome recent public pronouncements by the leaders in Pristina reflecting the need to establish better communication with the population and leaders in the northern Kosovo municipalities. I also note recent statements from the leaders in Belgrade, stressing the need for a comprehensive, lasting settlement on Kosovo, while ruling out the possibility of its division along ethnic lines. The

international community needs to support efforts by both sides to demonstrate strong leadership in overcoming barriers to communication and inter-ethnic trust.

55. I note with continued concern that progress appears to be slowing on two major issues essential for reconciliation: voluntary returns of the displaced and determining the fate of missing persons. In both areas, I hope that the coming year will be a time for redoubling efforts to assert the political will, not simply the technical resources, and to strengthen the cooperation that is required to produce better results.

56. It is my hope that the members of the Security Council will reinforce the firm messages delivered to the parties by UNMIK that it is time to muster the boldness, the courage and the pragmatism necessary to achieve genuine progress towards lasting peace and stability. It is also my hope that the Council will continue to express support for the role of UNMIK, especially in facilitating engagement between all stakeholders and containing tensions and confrontations on the ground. In this context, it remains crucial that initiatives undertaken by the international actors operating within the framework of the United Nations and resolution 1244 (1999) are strategically aligned and closely coordinated, in the overall interest of maintaining peace and stability in Kosovo.

57. I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative, Farid Zarif, for his leadership of the Mission and his efforts to advance cooperation between all sides and maintain security and stability in Kosovo and in the region. I would also like to commend the staff of UNMIK for their continued commitment to the goals of the United Nations.

58. I conclude by extending my gratitude to the long-standing partners of the United Nations in Kosovo – the European Union, NATO and OSCE – as well as to the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, for their essential support and close cooperation with UNMIK.

Annex I

Report of the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Secretary-General on the activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

(covering the period from 16 October 2011 to 15 January 2012)

1. Summary

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) continued to assist in long-term institutional reforms through its daily monitoring, mentoring and advising activities in the Kosovo rule of law sector. In its executive capacity, EULEX judges, in a mixed panel with local judges, began the main trial of the so-called Medicus case involving allegations of human organ-trafficking linked to a Pristina clinic. Major trials also began in the cases of a Kosovo Assembly member and nine ex-Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members charged with war crimes, and of two high officials indicted for corruption. A mixed panel of EULEX and local judges issued a verdict sentencing an individual to 18 years of imprisonment in a notorious war crimes case relating to the cooperative witness Nazim Bllaca. Meanwhile, roadblocks erected throughout the north of Kosovo since July 2011 (see S/2011/675, annex I) continued to severely restrict EULEX access to the north by road, compromising the Mission's ability to build and enforce rule of law north of the Ibar River. Close cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR has continued to be a priority for the Mission in addressing the political, legal and security implications of the current situation in the north, as well as further developments as they occur.

2. EULEX activities October 2011 to January 2012

General

EULEX is currently comprised of 2,531 staff (1,377 international and 1,154 local staff) engaged to support the Mission's executive and monitoring, mentoring and advising tasks as it works to strengthen Kosovo institutions.

In the north of Kosovo, the Mission remained in place at gates 1 and 31 at the crossing points with Serbia. Roadblocks along major thoroughfares in the north, specifically restricting the movement of EULEX, resulted in the postponement of trials and the rescheduling of hearings at Mitrovica District Court, and significantly limited the work of EULEX police. EULEX has continued to state unequivocally, through media and direct contact with Kosovo Serb representatives, the need to remove the roadblocks and restore free, permanent and unconditional access for all, to allow the administration of justice in the north to take place. On 2 December, an agreement on integrated management of crossing points was reached in the European Union-facilitated dialogue process between Belgrade and Pristina, with EULEX to be present at the crossing points in line with its mandate. The Mission continues to facilitate the implementation of other agreements, including on freedom of movement and civil registry books.

On 6 December the Mission received a letter from the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade announcing that a Russian convoy of trucks was headed to the north of Kosovo to deliver aid to Kosovo Serbs and requesting that EULEX escort the

convoy to its destination and back to the crossing point. The trucks arrived at gate 1 on 13 December, but were forced to wait for three days while EULEX escort vehicles were repeatedly blocked by the barricades north of the Ibar River. After an agreement was reached at the political level, the EULEX vehicles travelled through Serbia to gate 1 and successfully escorted the convoy to its destination.

The intent of EULEX to reinforce the rule of law in the north of Kosovo was increasingly hampered by the ongoing security situation. The monitoring, mentoring and advising by the Mission of Kosovo police north of the Ibar River decreased significantly, as EULEX police were unable to visit their local counterparts owing to movement restrictions. This decrease in interaction between EULEX and Kosovo police officers affected vital professional relationships and made it more difficult for the Mission to structure and organize the implementation of monitoring, mentoring and advising activities in the north. The regional Kosovo police commander, appointed on 13 October, showed signs of improved leadership capable of finding pragmatic solutions for Kosovo Serb police officers working in northern stations. This led to an incremental but positive trend towards integrating Kosovo police in the north into the chain of command and has improved information flow within the Kosovo police generally.

Against the backdrop of encumbered EULEX access to the north, the number of trials held at Mitrovica District Court decreased significantly. The Mission eventually exhausted all possibilities to transport justice staff to the courthouse, leading to the postponement of scheduled trials. Access to justice in the north was brought to a near standstill by these conditions.

On 21 November, a Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board retreat was held following the release of the 2011 European Commission Progress Report. The Board, which includes EULEX, the European Commission Liaison Office and Kosovo rule of law actors, focused on identifying and agreeing a set of priorities to guide the efforts of the Board over the next 10 months. These include the fight against organized crime and corruption, judicial sector reform and customs measures focused on the protection of society. The Board meetings allow for regular interaction between these major actors in order to prioritize legislation and internal reform in line with jointly identified priorities.

On 1 January 2012, the new law on the establishment of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court on Privatization Agency of Kosovo-Related Matters came into force. Under the new law, the Special Chamber will continue to provide for an independent judicial control mechanism for the privatization process in Kosovo, with special emphasis on working to reduce the large backlog of cases. The court's Appeals Panel continues to be staffed by a majority of EULEX judges, preserving international judicial oversight over the privatization process in respect of safeguards required by it and of the various international conventions referred to in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

EULEX also continued its efforts to provide monitoring, mentoring and advising activities within the Kosovo Ministry of Justice, focusing its efforts on ensuring a high standard of legal policy and legislative drafting in compliance with European best practices and international human rights standards.

War crimes

The trial of MP Fatmir Limaj and nine other former KLA members, charged with war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war in 1999, started on 11 November, with the defendants pleading not guilty. The EULEX prosecutor questioned Kosovo Prime Minister Thaçi and other former members of KLA about Limaj's role in the organization.

On 23 November, a mixed panel of EULEX judges and a Kosovo judge rendered a verdict in the so-called Bllaca case against Fahredin Gashi et al., finding the defendant guilty of war crimes and sentencing him to 18 years in prison. Hysri Rama, the other defendant in the case, received a suspended sentence of six months in prison for assisting the perpetrator in a politically motivated murder in 1999. The trial is the first based on statements by the cooperative witness Nazim Bllaca, who made a video confession in November 2009, giving details on more than 20 alleged politically motivated killings taking place from 1999 to 2003, many allegedly taking place under orders from the Kosovo Information Service, which served KLA until the end of the Kosovo conflict but was officially disbanded in 2008. The case was led by a EULEX prosecutor from the Kosovo Special Prosecution Office.

Corruption

EULEX and local judges adjudicated several corruption cases on mixed panels. On 19 October, a mixed panel at Pristina District Court confirmed the indictment of the Head of Kosovo Customs and Head of the Kosovo Customs Legal Directorate, moving to trial a case accusing them of abuse of official position relating to tobacco importation. The main trial began on 10 January 2012. On 12 January, EULEX and the Kosovo police conducted a raid on the Kosovo Ministry of Health as part of a corruption-related investigation, arresting several officials.

Through its monitoring, mentoring and advising activities, EULEX worked closely with local institutions in fighting corruption. The Mission supported the Kosovo government in drafting and implementing legislation and continued a training programme for Kosovo and EULEX judges, prosecutors and investigators on the use of existing confiscation powers as a standard tool in the fight against organized and other serious crime, including corruption.

Organized crime

The so-called Medicus trial regarding allegations of human organ-trafficking linked to the Medicus clinic in Pristina continued, having started on 4 October. EULEX has located and put under protection two key witnesses. The seven defendants are charged with one or more counts of trafficking in persons, organized crime, unlawful exercise of medical activity and abusing official position or authority. The high-profile trial continues to attract significant media attention due to the nature of the charges.

EULEX filed several indictments in other high profile organized crime cases and convicted an individual involved in a pan-European criminal network. On 11 January, a mixed panel of EULEX and local judges at Prizren District Court found eight persons guilty of human trafficking, issuing an aggregated sentence of 12 years of imprisonment for charges related to the trafficking and sexual

exploitation of a minor from Albania. The investigation was led by a mixed team of EULEX and local prosecutors.

On 17 October 2011, Clint Williamson assumed his position as Lead Prosecutor of the Special Investigative Task Force and immediately visited Pristina, Belgrade and Tirana to reconfirm high-level support for the Task Force. In meetings with Williamson, Kosovo's President Jahjaga and other Kosovo authorities all pledged their full support for and cooperation with the investigation. Serbia's President Tadić and Albania's Prime Minister Berisha made the same commitment in their meetings with Williamson. In all his meetings, Williamson emphasized that the investigation is complex, spanning different jurisdictions, and that it will take time to complete. Williamson also noted that, in addition to the allegations of organ trafficking often highlighted by the media, the Task Force is examining possible abductions, detentions, mistreatment and killings during the period in question, as well as any other crimes related to the allegations in the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Council of Europe, Dick Marty.

Williamson held meetings with European Union officials and members of the diplomatic community in Pristina, Belgrade and Tirana. He also met law enforcement and judicial authorities during each visit to discuss ways in which their cooperation with the investigation will be required. The Special Investigative Task Force is currently in the process of analysing information already collected from institutional sources, and is engaging other Governments that might be able to assist the investigation of the Task Force.

Approved by Xavier Bout De Marnhac
Head of Mission

Annex II**Composition and strength of the police component of the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(as at 15 January 2012)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number</i>
Germany	1
Ghana	1
Italy	1
Turkey	1
Romania	1
Pakistan	1
Ukraine	1
Total	7

Annex III

**Composition and strength of the military liaison component of
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(as at 15 January 2012)**

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Number</i>
Czech Republic	1
Turkey	1
Norway	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Spain	1
Ukraine	2
Total	9



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
31 January 2012

Original: English

**Identical letters dated 31 January 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

I write yet again to express Israel's serious concern about the rockets flying out of the Gaza Strip day after day into our homes, cities and communities. It is clear that these acts of terrorism could ignite an escalation of conflict in our already volatile region. Unfortunately, some members of the Security Council continue to turn a blind eye to the serious dangers posed by these attacks.

Last Friday, 27 January 2012, during the Jewish Sabbath, terrorists in the Gaza Strip fired a rocket into the area of Shat Hanegev in southern Israel. In the last two weeks alone, 14 rockets and mortars have been fired into Israeli communities, deliberately targeting the civilian population.

Israel expects the Security Council, and all responsible members of the international community, to condemn the relentless rocket fire from Gaza without any further delay. We also expect President Abbas, and other leaders of the Palestinian Authority, to finally raise their voices and fulfil their fundamental obligations to clearly denounce these acts of terrorism.

Israel holds the Hamas terrorist organization fully responsible for all attacks emanating from Gaza, where it remains in de facto control. Israel has exercised and will continue to exercise its right to self-defence, as appropriate, and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Haim Waxman
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires ad interim



Security Council

Distr. General
31 January 2012

Original: English

Special report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. As indicated in my report of 9 December 2011 (S/2011/759), the United Nations has been working closely with the African Union in planning future operations for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), taking into account new realities in Mogadishu and southern Somalia described in that report. On 5 January, the African Union Peace and Security Council, at its 306th meeting, endorsed a communique (S/2012/19) urging the United Nations Security Council to expeditiously consider and authorize additional support for the joint African Union-United Nations strategic concept for AMISOM operations.

2. This special report presents the request of the African Union, for the consideration of the Security Council, in the context of the political, strategic and operational dynamics in Somalia; identifies the support implications; and provides my recommendations. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2010 (2011), the report also provides an update on the relocation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to Mogadishu.

II. Strategic context

3. To inform the deliberations of the Security Council on the African Union request, I will first provide an update on recent progress and ongoing challenges in respect of the political strategy on Somalia and the United Nations broader security, humanitarian and recovery goals. I intend to present a comprehensive update in my regular report in April 2012.

4. Since 2008, the international community has pursued an ambitious political strategy on Somalia. We have aimed, first, to support the Transitional Federal Government in completing the tasks needed to end the transition, notably finalization of a constitution; second, to assist the Transitional Federal Government to broaden the base of the peace process through outreach and reconciliation; and third, to support the development of basic State governance and institutions, especially in the security sector. The comprehensive road map for ending the Somali transition, signed in Mogadishu on 6 September 2011, articulated specific tasks to be achieved in this regard before August 2012.



5. In recent weeks, efforts to agree to arrangements for the end of the transition have made significant progress. At the first Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference, held in Garowe, "Puntland", from 21 to 23 December 2011, the leaders of the transitional federal institutions, "Puntland", "Galmudug" and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a agreed on a detailed approach for ending the transition according to the Transitional Charter. The "Garowe Principles" provide for the adoption of the provisional constitution by a Constituent Assembly to be nominated by all road map signatories and civil society, and for the creation of a bicameral federal legislature, comprising a lower house of 225 representatives, and an upper house comprising representatives of federal States and regional administrations. The representatives of the Constituent Assembly and the lower house in its first four-year term would be selected through the 4.5 clan distribution formula; this formula would thereafter be abolished and elections would be conducted for subsequent parliaments.

6. The increasing momentum and the deepening of the political process are important steps forward. In taking forward the Garowe Principles, however, the parties must ensure genuine inclusiveness in the process. My Special Representative has been encouraging the parties to ensure that the constitution-drafting process, the Constituent Assembly and new bodies reflect the diversity of Somalis, including civil society, women and youth.

7. The approaching end of the transition raises the stakes for political actors in the current transitional federal institutions and continued political challenges are to be expected. The prolonged crisis in the Transitional Federal Parliament continued throughout January. My Special Representative is using his good offices to facilitate contacts among the parties and to urge them to resolve their differences within the framework of the road map.

8. Security gains continue to be made against Al-Shabaab. The international community has continued its efforts to help the Transitional Federal Government build security in Mogadishu and across the country, in order to enable the conditions for the extension of legitimate State authority and for long-term peacebuilding. In Mogadishu, AMISOM has continued to consolidate its control over all districts of the city and has begun operations in its outskirts. Outside Mogadishu, the combined operations of Kenyan military and Ethiopian troops working with forces allied with the Transitional Federal Government have continued to gain ground, including by taking Beledweyne on 31 December 2011. In an effort to increase State revenues and restrict financial flows to the Al-Shabaab insurgency, the Transitional Federal Government, on 17 December 2011, wrote to all Member States of the United Nations requesting a ban on imports of Somali charcoal, which are exported almost exclusively from Al-Shabaab areas.

9. With the generous support of Member States, troops are being paid and supported, as are 5,700 police. However, equipment, supplies and accommodations for military and police are lacking. Meanwhile, mechanisms for the necessary civilian oversight of the State's defence and security institutions, as well as of justice and corrections and the broader architecture supporting civilian security and the rule of law, are rudimentary. The Joint Security Committee, co-chaired by the Transitional Federal Government, UNPOS, the African Union, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and with strong

representation from the international community, will continue to play a pivotal role in this regard.

10. Taking advantage of the changed realities on the ground, the Transitional Federal Government has engaged political actors in areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab, especially with a view to reaching agreement on establishing an effective local administration for the next three to six months, and normalizing the situation. A detailed policy has been developed by the Transitional Federal Government on further outreach measures in the areas recently captured from the insurgents. The key priorities of this approach include: (a) promoting social reconciliation and setting up local political administrations; (b) restoring law and order and justice; (c) the containment of heavy weapons, followed by comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; (d) restoring humanitarian relief distribution and the repatriation of internally displaced persons and refugees; and (e) providing basic services.

11. The humanitarian situation remains critical and the delivery of humanitarian assistance remains a challenge. Despite significant progress achieved in pushing back the famine in southern Somalia in 2011, 4 million people are in urgent need of aid in the country and famine continues for up to 250,000 Somalis. The 2012 Consolidated Appeal seeks \$1.5 billion to address the needs of 4 million people who remain in need and to build the resilience that is necessary for households to withstand future droughts and other shocks, reducing dependency on humanitarian assistance. No significant progress has taken place in the area of human rights and humanitarian law, and the military operations in southern Somalia have renewed concerns regarding protection, population displacement and reduced humanitarian access.

12. Sixteen United Nations agencies are working in Mogadishu to implement stabilization and recovery projects covering human security, basic services and employment. On human security, this includes continued work with children and youth, the establishment of women's civil protection units; ongoing mine action work; support to the justice and corrections sector; support to the Somali police force and public radio stations. Also in Mogadishu, the United Nations is working to increase access to social services, including through support to local authorities and direct support to the health and education sectors. Agencies are also providing a social safety net for the most vulnerable through nutritional support. The United Nations is providing direct employment for people in Mogadishu through its public health projects and labour intensive rehabilitation of infrastructure. These efforts fall within the United Nations Mogadishu Stabilization and Recovery Plan but remain underfunded.

III. African Union-United Nations strategic concept

13. At the initiative of the African Union Commission, and against the background of the recent progress on the political and security tracks, African Union and United Nations planners jointly developed a strategic concept for future AMISOM operations in Somalia. The concept aims at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against Al-Shabaab, which, in turn, would be critical to extend the authority of the Transitional Federal

Government beyond the capital and to create space for the effective implementation of the road map.

14. The strategic concept was finalized during an African Union-United Nations joint technical assessment mission that included military planners from AMISOM troop-contributing and other interested countries, which took place from 5 to 17 December. The assessment mission concluded that the conditions were ripe to deal a severe blow to Al-Shabaab, despite considerable challenges and risks.

15. Based on a thorough ground assessment, the joint assessment team established that, in order for AMISOM to be able to conduct concurrent offensive operations throughout south-central Somalia, up to 35,500 troop and substantial resources would be required. The team also examined a minimalist option to maintain the status quo in Mogadishu, while rebalancing the Kenyan forces in the Juba and Gedo sectors, increasing the troop ceiling to a total of 15,700 troops. This option was found to be sub-optimal by the planners and was not recommended, as it would entail protracted military operations.

Recommendations of the joint assessment mission

16. The joint assessment mission recommended the most realistic and cost-effective option to achieve the objective of significantly degrading the military capability of Al-Shabaab and creating the security conditions for the implementation of the road map to end the transition. It entails raising the troop level to 17,731 uniformed personnel and a set of enablers and force multipliers aimed at achieving a fine balance between the operational requirements and a realistic level of resources through (a) the prioritization of areas of operation; (b) the phasing of the operation without significantly altering the desired objectives; (c) trading force multipliers and enablers for troop levels by maintaining capability; (d) requesting Ethiopia to continue to provide support to Transitional Federal Government AMISOM operations in the Bay, Bakool and Hirran regions; and (e) the provision of immediate operational logistics support to the Transitional Federal Government security forces.

17. The team assessed that the provision of enablers and multipliers was critical to (a) reduce the number of required troops; (b) enhance force protection; (c) support major offensive operations on multiple fronts; (d) the sustainment of forces in austere environments; (e) conduct timely medical evacuation; and (f) protect Mogadishu port and support sea control operations to impact revenues accruing to Al-Shabaab. Failure to secure this level of enablers and force multipliers would likely have a negative impact on consolidating the gains achieved and expanding operations, requiring higher costs of operations in the long run.

18. In respect of police operations, the assessment team assumed that the immediate focus of the AMISOM police operations will remain on capacity-building and law enforcement support to the Somalia Police Force. In this regard, the recommended option includes, within the recommended 17,731 uniformed personnel, a guard force, the deployment of 260 individual police officers and 2 formed police units, comprising 140 personnel each. The formed police units would be deployed to provide operational support to the Somalia Police Force, including the protection of international personnel in cooperation with the military guard force and, in exceptional cases, also vital installations. It is important to note that formed police units should not be seen as an extension of the military nor as

performing military duties and should be under the command and control of the AMISOM Police Commissioner. Considering the urgent need to re-establish the rule of law in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, the extent of support required for the Somalia Police Force is expanding, and there is a need to enhance AMISOM police capacity, including through the careful selection of necessary specialized police experts, enablers and multipliers to improve the operational effectiveness. While the deployment of international police officers to Mogadishu and the generation of the formed police units could be expedited, in close coordination with the Police Technical Working Group of the Joint Security Committee, there is an urgent need to develop a revised police concept of operations tailored to operations of the formed police units in this option.

19. The joint technical assessment mission undertook an initial inventory of the Somali security forces, and concluded that, notwithstanding significant international assistance in the past two years, gaps still exist in its areas of command and control, equipment, capacity and funding. The team established that, in addition to continuing efforts to develop the Somali security forces to enable them to eventually assume full security responsibilities from AMISOM, the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces are expected to play a greater role in the ongoing operations, including in holding cities and towns after the removal of Al-Shabaab. In pursuing this more immediate track, the urgent provision of operational logistics support to the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces would be critical to the implementation of the strategic concept.

20. As for the medium- to long-term track of developing the Somali security institutions, the assessment mission acknowledged the significant efforts of bilateral donors and recommended more focused and better coordination in the provision of future technical and material support, including to enhance the command and control architecture, the payment of stipends, ammunition and equipment, within the context of a re-energized Joint Security Committee and its working groups. Enhancing the command and control arrangements of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces was underscored as a vital priority both on the immediate and the medium- to long-term tracks. The assessment mission further identified the need to establish personnel management streamlining policies. It also noted the need for support to be provided to the Transitional Federal Government allied forces, including those of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, in conjunction with the Transitional Federal Government, in all regions where they are currently operating.

21. The team concluded that the planned expansion of AMISOM operations represents a renewed and unique opportunity to further consolidate all efforts on both tracks of the rebuilding of the Somali forces. The role and the responsibilities of the United Nations, AMISOM and bilateral donors in supporting the Somali security institutions, targeting both tracks, requires greater clarification on the basis of an accurate picture of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces. The team also foresaw the need for AMISOM to play a central role in channelling the support under the immediate track to be recognized and supported by all stakeholders.

Endorsement by the African Union

22. The African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the strategic concept on 5 January 2012 and decided, *inter alia*, on the deployment by Burundi and

Uganda of additional troops to reach the currently authorized strength of 12,000. The African Union Peace and Security Council also requested the United Nations Security Council to expeditiously consider and authorize the support required for the immediate implementation of the strategic concept. Moreover, the African Union Peace and Security Council requested the African Union Commission to accelerate the follow-on planning requirements, including the elaboration and the early finalization of a new AMISOM military concept of operations, a police concept of operations and a support plan to enable the execution of the AMISOM expanded operations.

23. Subsequently, in a letter dated 18 January, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission communicated the outcome of the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the AMISOM troop-contributing countries and other interested countries held in Nairobi on 17 January. The Ministers formulated a series of arrangements that have been brought to the attention of the Heads of State and Governments of the concerned countries. With regard to command and control, the Ministers agreed to establish the Strategic Coordination Mechanism to provide necessary advice to the African Union Commission, which would be responsible for providing strategic guidance and directives to the Mission through the established chain of command. It was also decided that the Force Commander would have two Deputy Force Commanders, one for operations and plans and another for Support, as well as a Force Chief of Staff. The African Union Commission will generate staff officers from the troop-contributing countries and other African Union member States. In addition, in order to enhance the role of the Transitional Federal Government forces and allied forces in the implementation of the strategic concept, the meeting agreed that there shall be stronger coordination and liaison arrangements between AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government at national and sectoral levels.

24. Moreover, without prejudice to the development of the military concept of operations, and as part of a natural evolution of the planning process, the Ministers agreed to reconfigure the sectors identified in the strategic concept by assigning the 17,731 uniformed personnel as follows:

(a) Sector 1: Banadir (Mogadishu) and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions: the current troop levels with the Burundian and Ugandan contingents shall be maintained (uniformed personnel strength: 9,500);

(b) Sector 2: Middle and Lower Juba regions (Kismaayo): the troops in this sector will consist mainly of the rehatted Kenyan Defence Force (uniformed personnel strength: 4,700);

(c) Sector 3: Gedo, Bay and Bakool (Baidoa) and western part of Hiraa regions: the balance of the 12,000 troops to be generated from Burundi and Uganda will be deployed in this sector (uniformed personnel strength: 2,500);

(d) Sector 4: Galguduud, Mudug and part of the Hiraa regions (Beledweyne): the Djiboutian contingent will be deployed in this sector (uniformed personnel strength: 1,000).

25. Notwithstanding the revised force structure, the Ministers recognized the need to optimize employment of the limited resources through cross-sector operations and support arrangements as designated by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission.

26. The Ministers also confirmed that AMISOM would conduct limited maritime operations in close coordination with the ongoing operations by international partners. In this regard, and taking into account the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 3 December 2011, authorizing the training and the deployment of vessel protection detachments on board supply vessels for AMISOM, a maritime component of the concept of operations will be required.

Operational planning

27. The joint African Union-United Nations planning team has been reconvened to immediately begin its work to develop a new AMISOM concept of operations, which will further detail the command and control architecture, sector demarcations including specific troops disposition and support plan, and other planning documents, such as the strategic directive, the Mission plan, the Force requirements, the rules of engagement and the status-of-forces agreement. The United Nations stands ready to continue assisting this follow-on planning process.

IV. Support implications

28. The expansion of AMISOM to 17,731 uniformed personnel, deployed across the four sectors listed in paragraph 24 above, has significant resource implications. The increase in support costs will be driven by several factors, including the larger geographical area of operations, climatic conditions, lack of security, weak infrastructure, mobility requirements of a dynamic combat force, the difficulty of using civilian contractors in a war environment, and lack of access in the short term to a proximate seaport in southern Somalia, such as Kismaayo, necessitating the use of circuitous and seasonal land corridors for supply lines. Within the parameters of the African Union strategic concept, greater or lesser levels of support can be envisaged. However, it should be clearly understood that the level of support selected will have an impact on the operational capability of the force.

29. Subject to the decision of the Council, it is envisaged that the existing United Nations logistical support package would be expanded to provide AMISOM with the support needed to operate effectively in all four sectors. Each sector would be provided a logistical hub, with structures, to house headquarters, medical facilities and stores. The remainder of the sector forces would maintain tactical camps to allow them to respond to the changing operational situation. The United Nations would continue to provide the current support package and limited self-sustainment in accordance with previous Security Council resolutions. In addition, the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment, including enablers and multipliers, would be covered from assessed contributions under an extended logistical support package. Only equipment deployed by the troop-contributing countries and considered owned by troop-contributing countries would be reimbursed. Equipment donated to AMISOM or where the ownership still remains with the donor would not be reimbursed.

30. The capacity of the expanded AMISOM to fulfil its objectives will be largely determined by the extent to which the Mission is appropriately resourced, in particular the enablers and force multipliers that are ultimately availed to it, such as a maritime interdiction capacity. Support for the generation of the full force requirements outlined in the strategic concept will allow the Mission to

simultaneously dominate multiple parts of the area of operations, to significantly degrade the military capability of Al-Shabaab and to support the Transitional Federal Government in projecting its authority. Limiting AMISOM to present support arrangements, by contrast, would restrict the force to static positions across its area of operations. This runs the serious risk of allowing Al-Shabaab the opportunity to regroup, losing the strategic opportunity and potentially exposing the force and its support to greater threat.

31. The option to continue the scope at a limited level is more economical in the short term, but offers significantly reduced capacity to positively influence the situation in south-central Somalia. The recommended option of expanding the support scope to include funding for enablers and multipliers promises a far greater impact. A final option that would include more substantial infrastructures within the four sectors is also possible, although it is questionable whether such an option is required in the current situation, as opposed to mobile and tactical arrangements.

32. The structure of United Nations support arrangements would not change appreciably under these arrangements. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) would continue to utilize sea resupply, commercial contractors and training uniformed personnel to execute United Nations support tasks. Wherever possible, seaports, such as at Mogadishu and Kismaayo, would be used to keep support costs to a minimum. To support locations in the hinterland, both military and commercial ground transport would be the primary means of supply. For emergency re-supply, commercial air carriers and helicopters can be employed.

33. This expanded package would allow new AMISOM units to deploy in all sectors, providing a limited secure location for political engagement and the protection of nearby populations. However, without multipliers and enablers, these forces would be static and would not be able to effectively engage Al-Shabaab or support the implementation of the road map. The authorization of force multipliers and enablers, including helicopters, transport units and possibly maritime assets, would be essential to provide AMISOM with greater operational capability and flexibility to engage Al-Shabaab over sustained periods.

34. Appropriate explosive threat management capacity should be included in the package to ensure the freedom of movement of AMISOM troops in sectors 2, 3 and 4, including the mitigation of the threat of improvised explosive devices, abandoned stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, and other explosive remnants of war. Requirements, while similar to those in Mogadishu, should enable AMISOM troops to cover significantly greater distances and secure areas much larger than the Mission experiences in the capital. As such, the proportionate amount of armoured demining and clearance equipment required will be significantly greater than that which exists in Mogadishu. An additional focus on mentorship will be essential in the realization of the requisite clearance and threat reduction tasks.

35. Level II medical facilities will also be required in sectors 2 and 3. Troop-contributing countries will be required to staff these medical facilities with partners, with UNSOA assisting with equipment, consumables and drugs. UNSOA will continue to provide medical evacuation services using medically equipped helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

36. Strategic communication and information support (public information) activities managed by UNSOA will need to be commensurate with the requirements,

as outlined in the AMISOM strategic concept. Overall coherence will require the establishment of a joint-combined Mission strategic communication mechanism, responsible for command and control and the coordination of and liaison on all public information issues. Operations will focus on the maintenance and enhancement of messaging and communication campaigns in support of security and political tracks. Radio broadcasting in support of AMISOM will be increased to keep pace with the expanded AMISOM area of operations and will be reinforced through efforts to establish a Somali public service broadcaster.

V. Relocation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia

37. As AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government forces open up more secure space for the peace process, it has become possible for the Special Representative to pursue much of his good offices directly in-country. In this connection, I am pleased to report that, as of 24 January, the Special Representative relocated his office to Mogadishu. Following a concept employed by the Organization in other non-permissive environments, UNPOS will henceforth operate from a main forward headquarters in Mogadishu, while retaining a rear base in Nairobi, until security and logistical conditions permit the relocation of the entire Office to Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia.

38. For the time being, given constraints of resources and the volatile security environment, the Mogadishu headquarters will comprise a team of 10 staff with political, security, human rights, public information and administrative functions supporting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Staff fulfilling tasks that can be accomplished from outside the country will remain in Nairobi, rotating into Mogadishu as required based on security and political priorities. Key tasks for the initial deployment will include good offices with the major Somali political and security actors in Mogadishu; support for the implementation of the road map process; and ensuring effective coordination with AMISOM, IGAD, the United Nations country team and the international community in Mogadishu.

39. The deployment of additional substantive UNPOS staff, with their functions, would require resourcing, for example, additional minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards-compliant offices and living accommodations and supplementary support assets (Communications and Information Technology Section, vehicles, furniture) and services (camp management, travel, rest and recuperation). Planning for this second phase is under way, and I shall report on progress to the Council.

VI. Conclusions

40. As I described to the Council in my previous report and in my briefing of 13 December, the situation in Somalia is at a tipping point. While the political and security situation on the ground remains extremely fragile, the prospects for positive change appear greater than they have been for many years. I am encouraged by the extraordinary international commitment to Somalia shown in recent months, by developments in the security situation and by the commitment of Somali political leaders, outlined in the Garowe Principles, to a clear process and timeline for the

conclusion of the transition. The way ahead, while confronted with risks and challenges, represents a moment of historic opportunity that we cannot let go by.

41. I commend the efforts of the African Union, the AMISOM troop-contributing countries and the countries of the region in developing a comprehensive strategic concept for AMISOM together with the United Nations. This joint process by the African Union and the United Nations has been an exemplary model of collaboration between the two organizations under the leadership of the African Union.

42. An expanded AMISOM is critical to seizing the present moment of opportunity. It represents a chance to support the Transitional Federal Government in extending its authority across a wider area of southern and central Somalia. It offers the Somali leadership the chance to reach out to the population in those areas, at precisely the moment when important decisions must be made about the constitution and the political future of the country in line with the road map. An expanded AMISOM also represents the best opportunity to significantly degrade the military capability of Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia and to limit the threats it poses to the country and the subregion, while preventing their relocation to other parts of Somalia.

43. It is my assessment that the recommended expansion of AMISOM outlined in the strategic concept and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 5 January represents the most pragmatic way forward in view of the prevailing circumstances on the ground, even though confronted with risks and challenges. I therefore recommend that the Security Council request the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia, and to increase its force strength from the current mandated strength of 12,000 to 17,731 uniformed personnel, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate. I further recommend that the Council authorize the development of an appropriately expanded package of logistical support, including support for enablers and force multipliers, to enable AMISOM to deliver its mandate in line with the new strategic concept.

44. As indicated in paragraph 30 above, the degree to which AMISOM will be able to meet its objectives will be dependent on the support it is provided, in particular the enablers and force multipliers. As the Council is aware, AMISOM and its troop contributors also require adequate, sustainable and predictable funding. Failure to provide this in the key areas of AMISOM operations will discourage the timely deployment of additional troops and hinder operations. Recognizing that we are in an environment of global financial constraint, I would ask Council members to ensure that tasks and resources are appropriately matched.

45. I emphasize that the goals and the objectives of the military operations must remain firmly grounded in the political process. It will be critical to establish a flexible mechanism for coordination among troop contributors and African Union, United Nations and Somali actors in Mogadishu. On the United Nations side, this will be facilitated by the relocation of my Special Representative and the deployment of an increased number of civilian staff to Mogadishu. In this regard, there will also be increased demands for security to enable civilians to perform their functions. I recall the request for the African Union to rapidly deploy the guard force, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2010 (2011).

46. The full transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali security sector institutions must remain our ultimate goal. In the long-term, this requires a comprehensive approach to development of the security sector that is anchored in the rule of law and the needs and the aspirations of the Somali people. In the immediate term, the Transitional Federal Government and its allied forces urgently require additional support to enable them to play their part in the ongoing military operations. A key priority that cuts across both tracks is the strengthening of the command and control arrangements of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces. The context created by the expansion of AMISOM represents an opportunity to consolidate all efforts and identify concrete steps in these two tracks. I commend the important efforts of Member States, the European Union, and the African Union, with the United Nations, to work together in these two tracks. I call on the international community to work with my Special Representative within the framework of a re-energized Joint Security Committee. Drawing from similar experiences, the time has come for bilateral actors to expand their engagement in this sector.

47. Addressing the risks and the challenges requires that we continue to work with the Transitional Federal Government and other Somali stakeholders, the African Union and IGAD, as well as the international community at large, to closely align and synchronize the political and the military efforts. It will be essential for the Transitional Federal Government to reach out to newly recovered areas and establish a transparent and inclusive process to engage with the local population and foster development of new administrations in line with the Transitional Federal Charter. It is also imperative to roll out on an urgent basis sustained recovery and stabilization efforts in the areas recovered from Al-Shabaab to meet the rightful expectations of these communities further to the military gains.

48. While we work towards sustainable peace and political stability throughout Somalia, we must recognize that the expansion of military operations is not without risk. It will be important for the Transitional Federal Government, its allied forces and international forces to take all possible measures to ensure that their operations do not negatively impact civilians and further complicate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I call on all parties to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and to ensure that protecting civilians remains a priority.

49. Looking ahead, it is essential to put in place the foundations of long-term economic recovery and reconstruction. We should recognize that long-term economic recovery will require changes in the pattern of development assistance and private investment to address the major infrastructure needs of a country devastated by 20 years of conflict.

50. More immediately, there is a need to consolidate and create incentives to sustain peace and stability. In this respect, support for the stabilization plans for Mogadishu and the areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab become of critical importance. We must provide investment and create incentives for peace and stability. I encourage donors to consider United Nations agencies to rapidly undertake projects that improve human security and access to basic services and create employment in areas that come under the control of the Somali Government.

51. I welcome the contributions from traditional and new donors to all aspects of the international intervention in Somalia. I urge that all support be coordinated

through the existing mechanisms for international support. The upcoming international conferences, including in London on 23 February and later this year in Istanbul, will be an opportunity to take forward the strategy together.

52. I take note of paragraph 14 of the African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué of 2 December in relation to the relabelling of AMISOM to a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

53. Finally, I pay tribute to the Governments of Burundi and Uganda for their continued sacrifice and commitment with respect to the cause of peace in Somalia. I reiterate my condolences to the families of the victims, including the relatives of the forces of the Transitional Federal Government, its allies and AMISOM soldiers who have lost their lives.





Security Council

Distr.: General
1 February 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 1 February 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of February 2012. In accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, I have the honour to request that Eamon Gilmore, Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland, in his capacity as Chair-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, be permitted to address the Council on 9 February 2012 at 3 p.m.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anne Anderson
Permanent Representative